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Abstract
Private and confidential information is increasingly stored online and increasingly
being exposed due to human errors as well as malicious attacks. Information leaks
threaten confidentiality, lead to lawsuits, damage enterprise reputations, and cost
billion of dollars. While distributed computing architectures provide data and service
integration, they also create information flow control problems due to the interaction
complexity among service providers. A main problem is the lack of an appropriate
programming model to capture expected information flow behaviors in these large
distributed software infrastructures. This research tackles this problem by proposing
a programming methodology and enforcement platform for application developers to
protect and share their sensitive data.
We introduce Aeolus, a new platform intended to make it easier to build distributed
applications that avoid the unauthorized release of information. The Aeolus security
model is based on information flow control but differs from previous work in ways
that we believe make it easier to use and understand. In addition, Aeolus provides a
number of new mechanisms (anonymous closures, compound tags, boxes, and shared
volatile state) to ease the job of writing applications. This thesis provides examples
to show how Aeolus features support secure distributed applications. It describes
the system design issues and solutions in designing a prototype implementation and
presents performance results that show our platform has low overhead.
Thesis Supervisor: Barbara H. Liskov
Title: Institute Professor
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Private and confidential information, e.g., credit card numbers and medical records,
is increasingly being stored online. Also increasingly this information is exposed due
to human errors as well as malicious attacks.
There are many examples of information leaks. Rudder was touted as a convenient
web-based financial planning tool where users can link their bank and credit card ac-
counts all in one place [32]. However, an announcement in May 2009 [19] reported that
their software had inadvertently shown users each other's bank account information.
Ryerson University in Canada violated the Freedom of Information and Protection of
Privacy Act with a software glitch that listed student names, ID numbers and grades
on its web site and has been publicly criticized for their negligence [49]. WellPoint,
a health insurer, exposed 130,000 of its customers' protected health information and
personal records online [21]. There are numerous other documented cases [48] where
software errors have jeopardized users' identity (e.g., Virginia Bureau of Insurance,
Comcast, Automatic Data Processing, University of Virginia), personal financial data
(e.g., Citigroup/ABN Amro Mortgage, CompuCredit, City of Riverside California),
and patient health records (e.g., Ohio State University Medical Center, Georgetown
University Hospital). These online systems are useful but for users to have confidence
in using them, the security of online information must be addressed.
This thesis describes Aeolus, a new platform intended to make it easier to build
applications that avoid the unauthorized release of information. The Aeolus secu-
rity model is based on information flow control. Traditionally, online information
has been secured through access control [15], which constrains who can read infor-
mation, but not what can be done with the information. Information flow control
is a complementary technique that instead restricts what can be done with infor-
mation. For example, an administrative assistant in a medical clinic needs to know
who the patients are in order to schedule appointments. If security is provided by
access control, nothing prevents the administrator from then leaking the information.
Information flow control allows the access while preventing the administrator from
using the system to leak the information, e.g., sending all patient files in email.
Information flow control has been of interest in military systems [58], where there
is a rigid classification of information, e.g., "secret" or "top-secret". Recently more
flexible forms of information flow control have been proposed in which individuals
are able to use discretionary control over their own information in a fine-grained way.
As discussed further in Chapter 8, this recent work provides information flow control
either through the use of special programming languages (e.g., [44, 51]), or at the
operating system level (e.g., [18, 69, 35, 70]).
Although this recent work is valuable, we believe it does not provide the support
that programmers need to build large-scale distributed systems that support infor-
mation flow control. The operating systems work helps facilitate retrofitting legacy
systems with support for information flow control, but it is lower level than what
programmers want when building new systems. The work on security-typed lan-
guages can provide strong assurances and provable security properties; however, this
approach requires new languages and complex type systems.
In contrast, Aeolus is defined at an intermediate level higher than the operating
system, but not requiring the use of a new programming language. Our goal is to
provide a tool that is easy to use and understand, yet provides the needed expressive
power so that programmers can implement applications in a convenient way. To
this end, we have focused on developing a model that is both simple and expressive:
the model provides the primitives that we believe will make it easier to write secure
applications with information flow control. Our approach allows implementations to
be distributed and to make use of components developed by third parties.
An important way in which Aeolus simplifies application implementation is by
embedding its security model within a distributed model of computation. This model
is object-oriented: a distributed program is composed of objects residing at one or
more machines. These objects are only able to communicate via a secure file system,
or by making remote procedure calls to one another's methods. Internally objects run
multiple processes; each time a call arrives it runs in its own process. These processes
are isolated: they do not share memory directly. However, Aeolus provides a limited
way for them to communicate, through secure shared state.
A secure distributed model of computation has not been provided by any of the
other approaches.
Aeolus is implemented as a platform that runs on a collection of machines within
an Aeolus configuration. All user code running on those machines runs on top of the
platform. The platform supports the Aeolus programming model. It tracks informa-
tion as it flows within and between the machines that make up the configuration, and
it controls the movement of that information, both among members of the configu-
ration, and to the outside (to machines that are not in the configuration and to I/O
devices).
Similar to the earlier work, Aeolus focuses on controlling information that is com-
municated directly, for example, written in an email message. Aeolus is aimed at pre-
venting errors from undermining information security, rather than malicious attacks.
It does not address leaks through covert channels, although we have been careful to
avoid introducing additional opportunities for covert channels via our mechanisms.
1.1 Contributions
This thesis makes a number of contributions.
1.1.1 The Model
We provide a new programming model in which application developers can specify
how sensitive data can flow through a distributed application composed of modules
from a diverse set of providers. Aeolus allows a developer to put together an ap-
plication with components that run on many different machines and that may have
been produced by different organizations; nevertheless the programmer can ensure
that sensitive data is treated properly, i.e., according to the desires of the owners of
the data.
The Aeolus model is based on concepts defined by others, in particular principals,
tags (categories), and labels, and uses information flow rules to enforce both confi-
dentiality and integrity, in particular, requiring authority or privilege to declassify or
endorse. However, it combines these concepts in a new way that we believe makes
the security model easier to use and understand.
Fundamental to flow control is the use of authority. In Aeolus, authority resides
with principals and processes always run on behalf of a principal. Aeolus only allows
a process with the proper authority to release confidential information or to vouch for
information having a certain integrity. Aeolus provides support for both information
flow control and access control, but using separate mechanism. In particular, it
supports access control in the usual way, using principals and access control lists.
1.1.2 Support for Modular Program Construction
A distributed computation is made up of software modules from different developers
and sometimes from third parties. It is crucial to effectively control the dynamic
behavior of different modules in these large-scale applications. Most important is the
support for a programming methodology where most code of an application runs with
minimum privileges to prevent programming errors from causing a costly information
leak. If only small portions of code perform privileged operations, they can be easily
isolated and verified. Then security of the application can be guaranteed by analyzing
only these critical modules rather than by examining the entire code base.
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Aeolus provides mechanisms that explicitly address modularity. It provides this
support through three complementary mechanisms.
First, Aeolus provides explicit support for the principle-of-least-privilege [52]. It
is well understood that this principle is the basis for writing secure systems. Aeolus
provides mechanisms that can be used to cause code to run with minimal or no
authority. The latter way of doing things is particularly useful, because in this case
the code will be unable to compromise security even if it has errors.
The second mechanism is the ability to bind authority to code, through the use
of anonymous authority closures. For example, a module that checks passwords can
be granted authority to produce the one bit isValid result. Before granting the
authority, a user can inspect this code and verify that it deserves the authority, the
amount of information being leaked in its results is small enough to be acceptable.
Aeolus ensures that the authority cannot be usurped: it is granted to just the closure
and cannot be used to do something different, for example, to print the password
on the printer. Additionally, Aeolus allows dynamic delegation and revocation of
authority to the closure, and it provides support for software upgrades.
Third, Aeolus makes the use of authority explicit and applies a just-in-time
methodology. Modules that are able to run with authority have to indicate exactly
when they want to use it. For example, the password checker contains code to do
the checking, but it can be written so that the release of the answer, which requires
authority, happens only at the end. This provides a proof point: a point at which
one can reason about whether it is safe to release the information. Any inadvertent
release of the password data prior to this point is not possible.
1.1.3 New Mechanisms
Aeolus provides a number of new mechanisms that make it easy for applications to
accomplish their tasks securely:
* Distributed Object Model. Distributed programs running on the Aeolus
platform are composed of a collection of objects that we refer to as app-objects.
App-objects can communicate only through remote procedure calls to one an-
other's methods, or through the secure file system. App-objects run as a collec-
tion of processes, and these processes are isolated, except that they can com-
municate via shared state as discussed below.
* Anonymous Authority Closures. Anonymous authority closures were al-
ready discussed above; we expect them to be heavily used in applications. Au-
thority closures tie authority to code so that it cannot be misappropriated. At
the same time, they support software upgrades and dynamic delegation and
revocation of authority.
* Boxes. All information flow mechanisms track contamination and processes
become contaminated when they read contaminated information. Furthermore,
once a process is contaminated, it requires authority to remove that taint. Boxes
allow contaminated information to be exchanged safely while providing senders
and receivers the means to control when they become contaminated. For ex-
ample, a box can be used as an argument in a remote procedure call, and the
recipient can protect itself from becoming contaminated by the box's content
if all it is doing is passing the box on to a third party, without looking at the
information inside the box.
* Shared State. We support fine-grained sharing of volatile information between
concurrent processes while tracking information flow using a special shared state
mechanism. Processes can share objects in the shared state; additionally, shared
state provides a means for processes to synchronize. However, the use of shared
state is limited to processes within the same app-object: each app-object has
its own shared state.
* Compound Tags. In many systems, the tags used to compartmentalize data
are related. For example, in a medical clinic, each patient's data has its own
tag, but all of these tags are related in that they represent information about
patients at the clinic. Compound tags allow relationships among tags to be
captured and permit efficient delegation of authority for groups of related tags.
1.1.4 Proof-of-Concept Platform
Application developers can construct secure programs using the Aeolus model. We
demonstrate that our model is implementable by developing a distributed computing
platform to deploy these programs. In particular, we provide a platform for running
local and remote software supporting local processes as well as remote ones (e.g.,
web services). Our working prototype demonstrates that our proposed programming
model can be implemented efficiently, in -20,000 lines of code, while supporting the
functionality needed to run real applications.
1.1.5 Application Use Cases
We also have application case studies that show that our model is sufficiently expres-
sive to support complex program interactions. Although the main goal for Aeolus is
to support new applications, we also looked at its use to prevent security errors in an
existing application. These studies provide a proof of concept for Aeolus, allowing us
to argue that our model is complete.
1.2 Outline
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. The next chapter provides an
overview of Aeolus defining our threat model and our high-level application model.
Chapter 3 describes the Aeolus programming model and it is followed by examples
that use our programming mechanisms in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 presents the design
of our distributed computing platform. The evaluation of Aeolus is broken into two
chapters: Chapter 6 examines the performance of the Aeolus platform and Chapter 7
applies the Aeolus model to several application scenarios to evaluate its expressive
power. Chapter 8 compares our research with other related work. Finally, Chapter 9
concludes and discusses extensions to this work.
Chapter 2
Aeolus Architecture
This chapter describes the system environment we assume for Aeolus, and the appli-
cation model it presents to users. We also discuss our threat model.
2.1 Aeolus Configurations
Aeolus provides information flow control for a distributed computing environment.
Our system consists of one or more nodes. We assume nodes are allowed to enter the
system through some kind of admission control, e.g., a node that wants to join must
present a certificate from a trusted party. We assume this party uses some mechanism,
beyond the scope of our system, to determine whether it is appropriate to allow a
node to join. Every system member has some associated registration information
known to all other members, including an IP address and a public key.
Our platform runs on all nodes in the system. We assume all in-system nodes
are trusted to run our platform and to ensure that user code is running on top of
our platform. User code runs on behalf of a principal. Aeolus vests authority in
principals, which it represents as principal IDs. However, we do not require that the
way we represent principals needs to match how this is done on a node in our system.
Instead, system nodes merely need to map from their representation to ours.
Aeolus tracks information flow within each node in the system and between sys-
tem nodes. It allows sensitive information to flow in messages, but the messages are
encrypted so that secrecy and integrity are protected. Aeolus also controls the flow of
information between the inside and the outside of our system. This flow can take the
form of communication with outside nodes. It can also involve the use of I/O devices:
all I/O devices are considered to be outside the system. If information is flowing to
the outside, the flow is allowed only if the application trying to send information has
the authority to declassify it (i.e., remove its contamination). Similarly, information
coming in from the outside has no integrity, which implies that the application re-
ceiving the information must have authority to endorse it if needed (e.g., verify the
input prior to storing it in a file).
Similar to other systems that provide information flow control, Aeolus tracks
information as it flows through programs, and determines whether programs have
the authority to perform certain security-sensitive operations, such as releasing secret
data. The latter operations require some way to track who has authority for what.
In Aeolus, this is done through authority state, which is maintained by our platform.
The authority state is logically centralized (although the implementation could be
distributed).
Compute Nodes Storage Nodes Authority State
User ser user User Use,
Code Code Code Data Data
Aeolus Aeolus Aeolus Aeolus Aeolus Aeolus
Figure 2-1: Aeolus Distributed Computing Environment
This architecture is illustrated in Figure 2-1. This figure shows an Aeolus system
configuration with some nodes inside the system and others outside; additionally
the devices are outside. The figure also shows that each node inside the system
runs the Aeolus platform, which determines whether security-sensitive operations
can be performed by consulting the authority state. As mentioned earlier, all user
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code running on an inside node runs on top of the Aeolus platform. The authority
state is shown as being stored at a single node, which is how we handle it in our
implementation.
This figure shows that some nodes are intended to run programs, while others
are used only to store sensitive data; of course some nodes might be used both to
compute and to store data.
2.2 Threat Model
Aeolus is aimed at preventing programming errors from undermining information
security. The complexity of software and distributed nature of today's software make
it difficult to ensure that the million lines of code in an implementation will not
leak sensitive application information. Software often has bugs and systems can be
configured incorrectly. We focus on software design methodologies and a programming
model that can minimize the occurrence of such errors. We do not assume perfect
confinement, e.g., a person can copy down displayed data; however, we assume that
information leak happens inadvertently rather than through malicious attacks.
We trust that nodes within our system run our platform and system adminis-
trators responsible for these nodes will take actions to protect them from malicious
attacks (e.g., network firewall, software patches, virus scans). We assume secure user
password management and un-compromised authentication services.
A closure binds code to authority. However, to support software upgrades for
closures, we accept new versions of this code, provided they are accompanied by
a certificate that covers the code; we verify this certificate by using a public key
associated with the closure. We assume that versions of closure code are supplied by
a trusted code repository that manages the secret keys securely.
In addition, in our prototype, we implement the platform code on top of the
language runtime, so this is also included in our secure base.
We focus on two types of data security issues: confidentiality and integrity. Con-
fidentiality ensures that secrets cannot leak. Integrity ensures that information is
vouched for properly. We do not address security issues related to the availability of
data (e.g., denial-of-service attacks) and resource allocation of system nodes.
Aeolus does not address leaks through covert channels, although we have been
careful to avoid introducing additional opportunities for covert channels via our mech-
anisms.
An Aeolus configuration might be used for a single distributed application, e.g.,
a medical information system running on many machines. It might also be used
to run several disjoint applications; each of these might be itself running on several
in-system nodes. All applications running on Aeolus must trust our secure base.
However, disjoint applications do not need to trust the user code running on the
nodes that support other applications; Aeolus will ensure that those applications
cannot interfere with one another. Instead applications need only trust the user code
that they make use of and even then, only if they give it some of their authority.
2.3 Application Model
This section provides an overview of how applications that run on Aeolus are struc-
tured.
We provide an object-oriented architecture in which an application is implemented
by a number of app-objects. For example, a developer can divide a server applica-
tion into app-objects for different tasks (e.g., one for handling incoming customer
requests, one for retrieving product catalog data, and another for periodically com-
puting statistics over usage logs).
Each app-object resides at a single node. An application may consist of app-
objects residing all on the same node or on different nodes within our system. App-
objects are isolated from one another: there is no direct sharing of data between
them.
Each app-object provides methods that can be called by other app-objects to
communicate with them. App-objects communicate via remote procedure calls. They
may also receive calls from nodes outside of Aeolus, and can make calls to such nodes.
--"iXI - ;r ^ ^ri-~ * i-~i;i--r i - _ iii ;i;-l--a; --?;----------- X--- -irr ~- ~^)i;-L"* _rr -iii*iir ;:~r -~-l=-~rrri~- l~ic~r --L- -I;i;-i- i. iilil^i)-il-l-ill-~~-IXI~-L---I--I~
RPC
Figure 2-2: Aeolus Application Model
Within an app-object, there can be multiple processes. Some of these processes
handle remote calls: each call runs in its own process. Others can carry out back-
ground activities. All of these processes are isolated: each runs in its own separate
address space. However, Aeolus provides a limited way for processes within an app-
object to communicate and synchronize via a shared state mechanism. Each app-
object has its own shared state, which can be used only by the processes in that
app-object.
This architecture is illustrated in Figure 2-2. This figure shows an example of an
online store application running on Aeolus. The application is implemented using
three app-objects: customer service, catalog service, and statistics service. The cus-
tomer service app-object is deployed on a different node to offload the processing of
incoming web requests. Our platform tracks information flow between Aeolus pro-
cesses, across app-objects on the same node, and over remote calls to app-objects on
other nodes.
Mo
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Chapter 3
Programming Model
The Aeolus model enforces information security by allowing application developers
to label critical data and permits information to flow from one system entity to
another only under certain conditions. Authority is needed to perform security-
sensitive operations.
In this chapter, we describe the programming model and how applications execute
under the constraints of our model.
3.1 Motivating Examples
First, we present some examples where information flow control is an important con-
sideration in the design of applications.
Bob and the Tax Preparer. In this example, which is borrowed from [45],
a vendor provides a service that, given a user's tax information (e.g., Bob's infor-
mation), produces a tax form. The tax information and the resulting tax form are
both confidential and should be visible only to Bob. To produce the tax form the
service makes use of a proprietary database that should only be visible to it, and the
resulting tax form is contaminated by this information. The system needs to provide
a way for the tax preparer program to decontaminate the result so that Bob can see
it, but also prevent the tax preparer program from making Bob's private information
visible to third parties.
Sales Analysis. This example concerns the commercial sector where it is com-
mon to use outsourced services; a discussion of control of information in this en-
vironment is discussed in [27]. A third party produces a tool that analyzes sales
information from many companies and produces results about customer preferences.
Companies that use the tool have determined through some mechanism that the final
result is acceptable to them (e.g., it doesn't expose details of their organizations).
The tool needs a way to produce the final result so that each company using the tool
can see the result. But additionally, the companies need a guarantee that the third
party won't be able to expose their private sales information.
The Medical Clinic. Clearly confidentiality in medical information systems is
a matter of great concern, e.g., see [41]. Here, we mention a couple of examples (in
addition to the one discussed earlier concerning the administrative assistant). First,
billing must be done based on the treatments and appointments that individuals had
during the billing period. The bills need to be sent to the appropriate parties (the
patient or his insurance company) but neither the raw data nor the bills should be
otherwise exposed. Second, a statistics package requires access to all patient records;
it is trusted to produce a result that obfuscates the data but it needs a way make
this public.
3.2 Principals, Tags and Labels
The Aeolus model is based on three key concepts: principals, tags, and labels. Prin-
cipals represent users or roles (e.g., user Alice or the company contractor role). Ap-
plication code runs within processes. Every process in Aeolus is associated with a
principal and runs with the authority of this principal. This allows it to perform
certain privileged label manipulations and delegations as discussed below.
Tags provide a way for principals to categorize their information. For example,
Bob might define three categories, one for public information, one for family infor-
mation, and one for private information.
Both principals and tags are represented by opaque randomly-generated and
globally-unique identifiers, referred to as principal identifiers (PIDs) and tag iden-
tifiers (TIDs), respectively.
Labels are sets of tags and are used to control information flow. Aeolus allows
certain objects to be labeled. All data objects (such as files and also objects in the
shared state) and all processes have two labels: a secrecy label, Ls, which reflects
confidentiality of information, and an integrity label, LI, which reflects the integrity
or validity, of information.
A tag can be used in a secrecy label or an integrity label or both, as shown in
Figure 3-1. For example, an application developer may use our model to create a
tag to represent the AliceShopping sensitivity category and include it in the secrecy
label to restrict where data derived from Alice's transaction history can go. The same
AliceShopping tag is used in the integrity labels of files containing online purchases
confirmed by Alice.
Process Object
Secrecy Label:
(AliceShopping)
SP: Aice
S: AliceShopping Integrity Label:
: : {} !- i -(AliceShopping,
checkouLogger) AlicePurchases.dat
Figure 3-1: Process, Object, Tags and Labels
When a labeled object is created, it is assigned a secrecy label and an integrity
label. These labels are immutable throughout the lifetime of the object. As a process
executes, it may access sensitive information from different sources and as it does
so its labels change. For example, an application developer might create two files:
FileA.txt and FileB.txt. FileA.txt is used to store Alice's personal data and is
assigned the tag AlicePersonal in its labels while FileB.txt is used for Bob's data
and is assigned the tag BobPersonal. The label of a process that reads FileA.txt
will contain the AlicePersonal tag to reflect the contamination by Alice's personal
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data. Next, we discuss the precise rules that govern such information flows.
3.3 Information Flow Control Rules
The information flow rules are defined as the conditions that must be satisfied for
information to flow from a source A to a target B. For example, this can happen when
process A writes to object B or when process B reads from object A. There are two
conditions and both of them must be satisfied. These rules are similar in concept to
the conventional lattice-based rules defined in [14].
Information Flow Constraints on Source A and Target B:
* Secrecy Condition: A.Ls C B.Ls
* Integrity Condition: A.L, 2 B.LI
When these conditions are satisfied, we say that A's labels are no more restrictive
than B's.
A label LA is a subset of another label LB if and only if LB contains all the tags in
LA. The secrecy condition says that the secrecy label of the source of the information,
A, must be a subset of the secrecy label of the target, B. The integrity condition
says that the integrity label of the target of the information, B, must be a subset of
the integrity label of the source, A (or equivalently, the integrity label of A must be
a superset of the integrity label of B).
The secrecy condition ensures that confidentiality is maintained as data propa-
gates. For example, if a process has knowledge of Company A's sales information, that
is, its secrecy label contains the corresponding tag, then the process can only write to a
file with secrecy label containing at least this tag. Thus, the secrecy condition allows a
process with secrecy label {CompanyASales} to write to a file with {CompanyASales,
CompanyBSales} but not to one with {CompanyBSales}. The integrity condition pre-
vents influences from low-integrity entities. For example, a file containing a set of
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verified account numbers may have the integrity label {AccountingVerified} and
the integrity condition will not allow a process without this tag in its integrity label,
for example, a process with an empty integrity label, to modify this file.
SOURCE A TARGET B
Ls = {CompanyASales, CompanyBSales) OK Ls = {CompanyASales, CompanyBSales}
La = {AccountingVerified} L = {}
Ls = {CompanyASales} VIOLATION Ls = {CompanyBSales}
L, = {AccountingVerified) (Secrecy) L, = {}
Ls = {CompanyASales} VIOLATION Ls = {CompanyASales, CompanyBSales)
L, = {AccountingVerified} (Integrity) L, = {AuditorVerified}
Figure 3-2: Examples of Information Flow Checks
Figure 3-2 illustrates these examples in greater detail. A violation in either the
secrecy condition or the integrity condition will trigger an exception in our model.
3.4 Label Manipulations
To satisfy the information flow rules, processes sometimes need to manipulate their
labels. Some manipulations are safe, while others are not.
Any process can perform safe label manipulations.
Safe Label Manipulations:
* AddSecrecy(in T): Adds a tag T to the process' secrecy label.
* RemoveIntegrity(in T): Removes a tag T from the process' integrity label.
These two manipulations are safe since they can only further constrain the use of
data. For example, a process with the added tag in its secrecy label {T} can no longer
write to a file marked with an empty secrecy label. These safe label manipulations
preserve secrecy (i.e., sensitive information doesn't become unmarked) and do not
jeopardize integrity (i.e., integrity can only be lowered).
On the other hand, the following two label manipulations are security-sensitive
operations.
Privileged Label Manipulations:
* Declassify (in T): Removes a tag T from the process' secrecy label.
* Endorse (in T): Adds a tag T to the process' integrity label.
Removing tags from a secrecy label potentially allows confidential data to leave
the system; since this can cause sensitive information to leak, this is considered a
privileged operation. Tags in integrity labels indicate the degree of confidence, so
adding tags to an integrity label must also be verified by the Aeolus Platform.
Aeolus ensures that the process has sufficient privilege before performing the op-
eration. Our system allows a privileged label manipulation only if the principal of
the process executing the operation has authority for the tag in question, i.e., the
tag being removed in a declassification operation, or being added in an endorsement
operation. Authority is discussed in Section 3.5.
Our model requires that all label manipulations be done explicitly. This is espe-
cially important for privileged label manipulations to be made explicitly because it
prevents accidental and unintended flows and encourages a just-in-time methodology
in which authority is used just at the moment that an intended flow happens. For
example, the sales analyzer would remove the company tags at the last minute as it
returns the result of its analysis; this reduces the chance that errors will cause release
of sensitive information.
3.5 Authority
A principal that is authoritative for a tag can perform privileged label manipulations
involving that tag. Authority starts with tag creation; when a process creates a tag,
its principal is granted authority for that tag. Authority is extended both implicitly
and explicitly. Implicit authority is obtained through the principal hierarchy and
explicit authority is given through authority grants. We give examples in Chapter 4
of how implicit and explicit authority are useful in a medical clinic.
3.5.1 Principals
Principals are arranged in a principal hierarchy, allowing one principal to act-for an-
other [20]. If a principal P1 is recorded as acting-for another principal P2, then P1 has
all the authority of P2. The act-for relationship is transitive. The principal hierarchy
is useful to capture organization structure (groups) and also it allows individuals to
use different principals for different purposes (roles).
A process running as principal P can create a new principal. This is done with
a CreatePrincipal request that returns a new principal ID, P1. In doing so, the
creator principal P automatically acts-for the created principal P1.
Creating a new principal:
* CreatePrincipal(out P): Creates a new principal Pl; the creator principal
acts-for Pl.
A principal P1 can allow another principal P2 to act for it by issuing an ActFor (in
P1, in P2) request. This call is legal provided it does not cause a cycle in the
principal hierarchy and the process' principal is authoritative for the actee principal
P1.
Delegating ActFor authority:
* ActFor(in P1, in P2): Allows principal P2 to act-for P1.
3.5.2 Tags and Grants
Any principal can create a tag by issuing a CreateTag request on our platform.
Creating a new tag:
* CreateTag(out T): Creates a new tag T; the creator principal has authority for
tag T.
A new tag T is returned and the principal that issued the request is automatically
given authority for the new tag T.
Figure 3-3: Act-for Relationships in Principal Hierarchy
Figure 3-3 shows an example of a principal hierarchy. The principal hierarchy is
a directed acyclic graph with nodes representing principals and with edges pointed
from an actor principal to an actee principal. This figure shows the principals that
created the various tags; for example, principal P4 created the tag T3. The act-for
relationships in the principal hierarchy allow P1 and P3 to derive authority for tag T3
Acts-For -
I I I II -1 -I --
even though they did not create the tag. (Note that the act-for relationships should
not cause loops as a loop will imply that all principals along the path should have the
same derived authority and hence are better represented as a single principal. This
single principal will represent a group role where all members have equal authority.)
With ActFor, the actor principal P2 implicitly inherits all the authority of the
actee. Additionally we allow explicit delegation of authority for tags. Explicit del-
egation of authority is much more controlled and therefore safer since the grantor
doesn't provide all the privilege. This method of delegation provides fine-grained
control. Just as tags allow applications to categorize information and provide sep-
arate controls for different categories, grants allow applications to control authority
over those categories in a constrained way.
When principal P1 uses Delegate (in T, in P1, in P2) to explicitly grant the
authority for a particular tag T to principal P2, this operation is permitted if the
process' principal acts-for principal P1 and principal P1 has authority for tag T.
Explicitly granting authority:
* Delegate(in T, in P1, in P2): Grants authority for tag T from principal P1
to P2
Figure 3-4 compares implicit and explicit delegation; in both cases, P1 has au-
thority for tag Ti. On the left, P1 has been allowed to act-for P3 ; Pi thus has derived
authority for tags Ti and T2 through principal P3. If principal P3 wants to limit the
delegation to only tag TI, it can do this by issuing Delegate(T 1 , P3 , PI) instead
as seen in the right subfigure. An authority chain is maintained for each explicit
delegation to keep track of the origin of the authority.
3.5.3 Compound Tags and Static Grouping
Explicit delegations can be cumbersome to use. For example, a clinic administra-
tor has to delegate the tags of each patient to the principal generating the billing
Pj's authority for T1
Implicit Authority Explicit Authority
ActFor Delegate
I T,
Figure 3-4: Comparing Implicit and Explicit Delegation
information.
To support this common usage pattern, we provide compound tags. This mech-
anism allows tags to be grouped statically, as they are created, e.g., all patient tags
are created in the same group. The compound tag can be delegated to a principal
and this gives this principal authority for all tags in the group.
A compound tag (or top-level tag) is created with the tag creation operations men-
tioned previously, namely, CreateTag(out T). To create a sub-tag, a process issues
CreateSubTag(in T1, out T2), where T1 is the top-level tag that the newly created
sub-tag T2 is associated with. When a principal is given authority for a compound
tag, it has authority for all its sub-tags. T1 must be a top-level tag; otherwise an
exception is raised.
* CreateSubTag(in T1, out T2): Creates a sub-tag T2 of top-level tag T1; the
principal that makes this call has authority for tag T2.
We chose to group tags statically (i.e. at creation) because this approach has
significant implementation advantages over grouping them dynamically: as discussed
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in Chapter 5, we need not store static groups using explicit data structures. Further-
more the examples where large numbers of delegations were needed allowed a static
solution: it was natural to think of patient tags as being related, or to think of all
users of a web service as being related.
Static grouping doesn't work for every situation. For example, compound tags
don't work for the sales analyzer, since in this case we cannot expect that the sales
tags for the different companies are put into same group a priori.
We also chose a simple 2-level hierarchy for tags rather than a general hierarchy.
We did this because there appeared to be no need for a general hierarchy in our
examples. If we discover a need for a general hierarchy, the model can easily be
extended to provide it.
3.5.4 Revocation
Aeolus allows authority to be revoked. Implicit authority can be revoked by remov-
ing a link in the principal hierarchy using RevokeActFor(in P1, in P2) where P1
is the actee principal and P2 is the actor principal. The removal has a transitive
effect: not only is P2 no longer able to act-for P1, but all principals that act-for P2
no longer act-for P1. Explicit authority can be revoked by removing a delegation
using RevokeDelegate(in T, in P1, in P2) where T is the tag (compound tag or
subtag) for which authority was granted, P1 is the grantor principal and P2 is the
grantee principal. This also has a transitive effect: if P1 delegated authority for tag T
to P2, and later P1 revokes this delegation, this removes authority for tag T from P2
and also from any principal P2 granted that authority to using this authority. Our
use of delegation chains allows revocation to match intuition: any delegations that
happened as a result of the first delegation are also undone. For example, if Alice
delegates tag T to Bob and Bob delegates to Tom, and then later Alice revokes Bob's
authority for tag T, this takes away Tom's authority for tag T as well.
Revoking authority:
* RevokeActFor(in P1, in P2): Revokes principal P2's ability to act-for PI.
* RevokeDelegate (in T, in P1, in P2): Revokes the delegation of tag T from
principal P1 to P2.
Similar to delegations, requests for revocations are checked to ensure that they are
issued by a principal with sufficient authority. The principal of the process issuing
the request must be authoritative for the actee principal P1 in RevokeActFor (in P1,
in P2) and for the grantor principal P1 in RevokeDelegate (in T, in PI, in P2).
3.5.5 Principal Hierarchy
The principal hierarchy is a directed acyclic graph that expresses act-for relationships
between principals. It has the principal Proot at the top of the hierarchy and the Ppublic
principal at the bottom. The Proot principal acts-for all principals but no principal
acts-for it whereas the Ppublic principal does not act-for any principal and has no
authority but all principals act-for it.
- - -
k j Ppublic
Figure 3-5: Special Principals
We provide a way to talk about the Ppublic principal explicitly. Any process can
switch to running with the Ppublic principal. When a process is running with this
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principal, it doesn't have any authority and therefore cannot perform privileged op-
erations such as declassifications and endorsements. Also, the system will not allow
another principal to assign authority to Ppublic via explicit or implicit delegations.
Furthermore, this principal cannot create tags and subprincipals. Running with the
Ppublic principal is ideal for sections of code where we simply want to track the prop-
agation of sensitive data with no need to perform privileged operations.
Our system also has a Proot principal. It is up to the application using the system
to carefully control login so that this principal is used only when absolutely necessary.
Aeolus prevents a process running as Proot to allow another user-created principal to
act-for this principal.
3.6 Authority Closures
When a principal is given authority via delegations, there is no guarantee as to what
code will use the authority. There are situations in which a user is willing to allow a
service to declassify some of its data only after some transformations have sufficiently
obfuscated the data. Authority closures allow programmers to obtain such a guarantee
by granting authority directly to code. We expect authority closures to be widely
used. For example, statistics over a medical database can be published provided
details about individuals are not exposed. Similarly, a principal might be willing
to endorse some data after a computation has checked that the data meets certain
constraints. For example, an input verifier can check that a parameter is in the proper
format and will not subject the program to an injection attack.
When an authority closure is created, it is associated with a new principal but that
principal is anonymous and unrelated to any other principal. Since the anonymous
principal is unrelated to any other, when the closure is first created it has no privileges.
However, we allow authority for specific tags to be delegated to it, and also it can be
made to act-for some (non-anonymous) principal. Importantly, though, there is no
way to make some principal act-for the closure or for the closure to delegate authority
for tags to another principal. We check and prevent an anonymous principal from
issuing Delegate and ActFor requests. That way, we can guarantee that only the
closure can use the authority granted to it. Limiting the closure to the authority
prevents security leaks due to errors that happen later. For example, suppose the
programmer who created the closure was able to act-for it; then later, he could
accidentally misuse the closure's authority.
Conceptually, an authority closure binds an anonymous principal to some code
provided when the closure is created. Binding directly to code provides very strong
guarantees, but doing so is undesirable, for two reasons. First, we don't want Aeolus
to be a repository for code, nor to be bound to code repositories, e.g., certain file
systems where code is stored. This problem could be solved by storing a hash of the
code rather than the code itself, but this doesn't solve the second problem: providing
support for software upgrades.
To allow software upgrades, we instead bind a closure to a key that is provided
when the closure is created. We assume here a trusted version management system
used by the application; the key provides confidence that the version came from the
trusted source. CreateClosure (in key, out CL1) takes in a key as an argument
and returns a new closure ID CL1. During its creation, the key and a new anony-
mous principal are associated with this closure ID CL1. When an authority closure is
invoked, the requester supplies the closure ID CL1, the code to run, and a certificate
cert. This certificate must cover the code and must be signed by the closure's key;
if this check fails, the call isn't allowed.
Here are some operations related to creating closures and delegating authority to
them:
* CreateClosure(in key, out CLI): Creates a new closure with the key, asso-
ciates an anonymous principal PA with the closure, and returns the closure ID
CL1.
* ClosureActFor(in P1, in CLI): Adds an act-for link from the anonymous
principal of closure CL1 to actee principal P1, provided that the process' prin-
cipal acts-for principal P1.
* ClosureDelegate(in T, in Pl, in CL1): Gives authority for tag T from
grantor principal P1 to grantee anonymous principal PA of closure CL1, provided
that the process' principal acts-for principal P1 and principal P1 is authoritative
for tag T.
An example of an authority closure is the method IsPasswordValid(in username,
in password, out isValid) which checks against a file containing user and pass-
word information. The method returns a boolean value isValid on whether the
input password is correct. The file is tagged by a tag TPassword in its secrecy label
to protect passwords from leaking. In this case, a developer trusts that the out-
put boolean value can be declassified since it reveals very little information about
the actual passwords.' The IsPasswordValid method performs the privileged label
manipulation, Declassify (TPassword) just before returning the boolean value. The
authority to remove this tag from the process' secrecy label is granted to just to this
authority closure, which ensures that the authority can only be used when running
this code.
We chose our solution of using a key because it gives maximum flexibility. Not
only does it allow for software upgrades, it also allows for running different code
on different machines (e.g., on .NET and on JVM). But still the system is secure,
assuming a trusted code repository.
3.7 Execution
Once a process starts running, it can switch to run code as different principals via
calls and forks. In addition, the developer can specify the declassifications and en-
dorsements that are applied to the process' labels before running this code. Switching
'Note that this 1-bit output still reveals some relationships between users and passwords. Iterative
invocations of this method can potentially be used in dictionary attacks. However, our goal is not
to achieve perfect secrecy but merely to allow developers to identify code segments that are highly
critical to system security.
to different principals allows code to run with only the privilege it needs for its task,
following the principle-of-least-privilege. Applying declassifications and endorsements
to specific code is an example of our just-in-time methodology.
3.7.1 Local Calls
Most local calls execute as-is and without the intervention of Aeolus. However, when
the application wants to make a local call with a change in principal (e.g., to Ppublic),
such requests must go through our system.
* Call(in C, in P, in listS, in listI): Runs code C of type
AeolusCallable in the same process with principal P. The process' labels are
adjusted using the lists of tags listS and listI to apply declassification and
endorsement, respectively, to the process' labels prior to invoking code C.
Code objects of type AeolusCallable have an Invoke method that our system
can call. This method has neither arguments nor results; instead the object can hold
arguments and return values in its internal state.
When a process issues a Call, it can specify the principal P that it wants to run
code C with. It can also optionally specify the lists of tags lists and listI for
applying declassification and endorsement to the process' labels, respectively. Aeolus
checks that the process' principal acts-for principal P and that the caller principal
has authority for all tags in listS and listI. The Call then runs with the adjusted
process' labels (i.e., the tags in listS are removed from the secrecy label and those in
listI are added to the integrity label). After the Call finishes, the caller's principal
is restored and the caller process' labels are updated to reflect any contamination
picked up as a result of the call (i.e., its secrecy label is union-ed with the caller's
and its integrity label is intersected). The ability to change the labels at the same
time that the principal is changed is important because the callee may not have
the authority to do this itself. For example, a printer controller is run without any
authority; it is passed the data to be printed as an argument and it must have a null
secrecy label since otherwise it won't be able to use the printer.
3.7.2 Local Forks
A process can run as multiple threads, all in the same address space; in this case, all
the threads have the same principal and labels. A fork can be used to create a new
process that has its own address space and information flow state:
* Fork(in C, in P, in listS, in listI): Runs code C of type
AeolusCallable in a new process with principal P. The process' labels are ad-
justed using the lists of tags lists and listI to apply declassification and
endorsement, respectively, to the process' labels prior to invoking code C.
Again code C is an object of type AeolusCallable with an Invoke method. When
a process issues a Fork, it can run with the same principal as the caller's or it can
optionally specify the principal P that it wants to run the code with. Aeolus performs
the same information flow and authority checks as for a Call. If these checks pass,
a new process is started with the appropriate principal and process' labels. Code
object C is copied (i.e., serialized) to the new process. This code object may contain
arguments and the copy of these arguments is the only data that the code can access.
A fork is not expected to return to the caller so the caller's labels are unaffected by
those of the forked process.
3.7.3 Example of Calls and Forks
The ability to limit the authority of code segments is an important property in con-
structing secure distributed applications. An application is a conglomeration of func-
tions with different responsibilities. To minimize programming errors, we want to
give functions only as much authority as they need to get the job done. Application
developers are strongly recommended to identify critical functions and assign different
principals to run various portions of their code and to carefully consider how author-
ity changes can impact the overall information security of their programs. Forks and
Calls allow different parts of code to run with different authority.
In Figure 3-6, we show an example of a Clinic Administrator application that
uses Fork and Call to restrict the privilege when performing different tasks. An
administrator may run this application on his/her desktop machine and use it to
print out patient visit summary information at the end of a consultation, to look up
phone numbers of a medical lab, or to send e-mails to hospital staff. The Main code
presents a menu of tasks for the administrator to select from. In this example, the
administrator wants to print patient Bob's visit summary and the application invokes
the PrintVisitSummary code with Bob's patient ID. To avoid errors in mixing up
patient records, the application forks off a new process to run this code and reduces the
authority of the new process by running it with PBobPatient rather than the PClinicAdmin
principal that has authority for all patients' tags.
The PrintVisitSummary code uses the subroutine GetConsultationSummary to
examine Bob's records and generate a summary. This subroutine is invoked using
Call and is made to run with the Ppublic principal as this code does not require any
authority. By running this code with Ppublic rather than PBobPatient, the developer can
be assured that programming errors within GetConsultationSummary cannot leak
Bob's sensitive medical data. When this method accesses Bob's patient record, it adds
the tag TBobMedical to the process' secrecy label and returns the visit summary. The
PrintVisitSummary method can then exercise its authority to issue a Declassify
prior to printing the patient summary on the local printer.
3.7.4 Authority Closures
Any process can invoke an authority closure.
Clinic Administration Application
Main code:
P= PClinicAdmin
1. Select a task (e.g., Print Visit Summary, Lookup Phone Directory, Send
E-mails)
2. Choose to run PrintVisitSummary for patient Bob
2a. PrintVisitSummary.PatientID = Bob's ID
2b. Fork (PrintVisitSummary, PBobPatient, {}, {})
PrintVisitSummary. Invoke() code :
P =PBobPatient
1. Generate Consultation Summary
la. GetConsultationSummary. PatientID = this.PatientID
lb. Call(GetConsultationSummary, Ppublic, {}, {})
Ic. summary = GetConsultationSummary. summary
2. Declassify (TBobMedica)
3. Print summary to local printer
GetConsultationSummary. Invoke() code:
P=Ppublic
1. Retrieve patient data and produce visit summary
la. AddSecrecy (TBobMedical)
lb. Read data with this.PatientID
2. Generates and returns this. summary
Figure 3-6: Example Usage of Fork and Call
* CallClosure(in C, in listS, in listI): Forks a process to run code C of
type AeolusClosureCallable, with the anonymous principal PA associated
with the closure. The process' labels are adjusted using the lists of tags listS
and listI to apply declassification and endorsement, respectively, to the pro-
cess' labels prior to invoking code C.
When invoking an authority closure, code C is an object of type
AeolusClosureCallable, which is a sub-type of AeolusCallable and hence, has an
Invoke method that our system can call. In addition, the AeolusClosureCallable
also includes a closure ID in its internal state and a method GetCertificate that
can be used to obtain the certificate that proves the code is that of the closure.
When a CallClosure request is made, Aeolus uses the closure ID in Code C to
retrieve the key and anonymous principal associated with the closure. It checks to
ensure this code is certified by the key (by examining the certificate associated with C)
before executing it with the anonymous principal. The requester can include lists of
tags listS and listI to apply declassification and endorsement, respectively, to the
process' labels prior to invoking code C. Aeolus checks that the caller's principal has
authority for these tags. While the closure is running, the calling process is blocked
waiting for it to complete. When the closure returns, the AeolusClosureCallable
object is copied back to the caller's process, and the caller's labels are adjusted to
reflect any contamination picked up as a result of the closure call.
While the closure is running, the system prevents the process from delegating
its authority or allowing another principal to act-for it. Furthermore, the closure
is executed in a new process and hence its authority cannot be usurped by threads
running concurrently in the caller's process.
3.7.5 Remote Procedure Calls
Remote procedure calls are carried out as method invocations on remote objects. To
a developer, a remote method is indistinguishable from a local method invocation.
Our platform ensures that the method runs with the caller's principal and process
labels on the remote machine and when the result is returned, the local process' labels
are updated with the remote process' labels. Additionally, at the called object, the
call runs in its own process, with its own address space and authority state. If the
developer wants to run the remote call with a different principal or process labels,
it can do so using Call and invoking the remote object within the AeolusCallable
code object.
3.7.6 Launching app-objects
Any process can launch an app-object by calling:
* Launch(in C, in P, in S, in I): Starts up a new app-object with configu-
ration C. This app-object contains a single process, running with principal P,
and with labels S and I.
A caller process launching an app-object must satisfy certain information flow
constraints before the launcher will create this app-object. It supplies configuration C
which contains all the necessary information (e.g., path to code libraries, input argu-
ments, information about what code the app-objects process will run) for the launcher
code to bootstrap the app-object. Since information can be leaked through this data
directly or covertly, Aeolus requires the caller to have a null secrecy label. Similar to
Calls and Forks, the caller process' principal must also act-for P. Furthermore, the I
label must be no less restrictive than the caller process' since information flows from
the caller process to the new process in the created app-object. Once the new process
starts, it runs completely independently from the caller process; for example, the new
app-object has its own shared state that the caller process cannot access.
3.7.7 Logging in
An app-object can also start running through a log-in procedure. We assume servers
have an authentication mechanism that determines what principal is assigned when
a user logs-in. Since servers within our system are trusted, different servers can use
their own log-in techniques. We do not require uniformity in the way servers represent
their principals; instead they only need to map their principals to ours.
These trusted log-in procedures present Aeolus with the principal ID of the logged-
in user and the code to start running with. Aeolus creates an app-object to run the
code in a process within this app-object. The log-in procedure can also specify the
initial secrecy and integrity labels to run this process with.
3.8 Data
3.8.1 Files
Many applications require support for persistent data so that computation results and
user data can be stored on disks and retrieved at a later time. Networked file systems
and databases are typically used for these tasks. In addition to data persistence, they
can also act as repositories for data that is shared by users on different machines. For
example, an organization may have various application servers accessing a common
set of files. A healthcare organization may have patient health records and person-
nel information stored over several storage servers. This thesis provides for secure
persistent storage via a file system.
File systems represent data in a hierarchical manner. Directories are like con-
tainers and files are like objects inside containers. Containers may have on them
descriptions about the objects they store. A container can also store other contain-
ers. As one opens a container, the objects revealed may be more sensitive than the
outside. This is analogous to a sealed envelope with the address of the intended
recipient written on it and within it, a confidential letter. Our model for persistent
storage interfaces is based on this concept.
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Figure 3-7: Labels on Files and Directories
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Figure 3-7 shows how file systems are modeled using this container-object con-
cept. The containers and objects higher up in the hierarchy are less restrictive. For
confidentiality, this translates to more sensitive data being stored further down in
the hierarchy, making them less accessible for reads and disclosures (e.g., putting Al-
ice's patient records inside the "Alice" directory). For integrity, this means that it is
harder for a process to have the authority to write to a container or to object higher
up such as the root directory.
Directories are arranged in a hierarchical manner and directories and files exist
logically within directories. Directories are special files with information about the
files they contain. The labels on directories reflect the information flow concerns of
the metadata (e.g., the existence of particular files). Files have immutable labels and
a file's labels must be no less constraining than those of the directory that contains it.
File reads and writes are allowed only if the information flow constraints are satisfied.
To create a file, the parent directory is updated (read and written) and the new
file is created inside this directory. The parent directory contains the list of files
and the new file is added to this list. This directory is also read because if the
file already exists, this can trigger an exception and a process can learn about the
existence of a file in this way. Therefore, the caller must have secrecy and integrity
labels equal to the directory's to permit the update. However, the file to be created is
often intended to be more restrictive than the parent directory and more restrictive
labels can be specified for it. For example, the directory \user\alice\ may have the
secrecy label {AliceInfo}; Alice can create a file inside this directory with a process
that is currently running with secrecy label {AliceInfo} and specify that the new
file \user\Alice\letters.txt has the secrecy label {AliceInfo, AliceFamily}.
Creating a sub-directory is handled in the same way as creating a file under a parent
directory. All files and directories are uniquely identified by their file path and the
labels on them do not change after creation.
Deleting a file is also treated as an update to the parent directory and hence the
caller must have labels that are the same as the parent directory's. When application
requests a directory to be removed, all subdirectories and files will also be removed.
When a file is read, the directories along the file path are also (implicitly) read.
However, since labels of files within a directory are at least as restrictive as the
directory, Aeolus only needs to check that the process' labels allow the read of the
file based on the file's labels. This will imply that the process can also read all the
directories along the path. To write a file, a process must have labels that allow the
write based on the file's labels. We assume that any exception raised during the write
(e.g., exceeding disk quota) does not reveal any sensitive information about the file
itself and hence the write does not require the process to also be able to read the file.
Table 3.1 summarizes the above label checks and restrictions for basic file operations.
Table 3.1: Information Flow Checks for Basic File Operations
File Operations Information Flow Constraints
CREATE Read(Dir)+Write(Dir)
READ Read(File)
WRITE Write(File)
DELETE Read(Dir)+Write(Dir)
Aeolus supports selective declassification and endorsement when writing files, ap-
plying authority on the written file rather than the entire process.
* ReadFile(in F, out buffer): Reads file F into buffer.
* WriteFile(in F, in buffer, in listS, in listI): Writes content of buffer
to file F.
The WriteFile request has two optional lists of tags, lists and listI, to specify
the tags that are automatically declassified and endorsed as data are written. The
file write request is allowed only if the process has authority for the indicated de-
classification or endorsement. Such selective declassification captures our notion of
just-in-time use of privilege.
Another common interface that file systems provide is the file-stream. The file-
stream provides a pipe abstraction to the file content. The life cycle of a file-stream
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starts with the opening of the file-stream, at which time the file is internally bound
to the file-stream and the access mode (read-only, write-only, read-write) is defined.
Then, depending on the access mode, the user can read (or write) the next group of
bytes from the file, pause to process the data, and then continue. When the user is
done with the file, the file-stream is closed.
Besides operating with entire files, the Aeolus API also supports file-streams.
* CreateFilestream(in F, in M, in listS, in listI, out fs): Opens a
file-stream fs for file F with access mode M.
* fs. CloseFilestream(): Closes the file-stream fs.
* fs.Read(in N, out buffer): Reads N bytes from the file-stream into buffer.
* fs.Write(in buffer): Writes the content of buffer to the file-stream.
File-streams are created using CreateFilestream(in F, in M, in listS, in
listI) and the access mode M is specified as one of READ-ONLY, WRITE-ONLY or
READWRITE. For writable file-streams, similar to WriteFile, the application can also
optionally supply lists and listI, which are lists of tags that are use for declassi-
fication and endorsement of the data being written. Aeolus checks that the process'
principal has authority for these tags when the write is performed.
When a file-stream operation is requested, Aeolus checks that the process has the
appropriate labels to satisfy the information flow. For a file-stream read operation,
the process labels must permit the read based on the file's labels. For a file-stream
write operation, the process labels and the file's labels must permit the write (taking
into account any selective declassification and endorsement).
Every file-stream read and write is checked to ensure that the process' principal
and labels still permit the file operation. While checking at every read and write
operations appears to be expensive, we describe techniques in Chapter 5 that are
inexpensive.
The rules for file system operations in this section prevent unintended information
flow to and from the file system. We ensure that a process cannot leak data to files and
process' labels reflect the contamination of files a process reads. In addition to these
constraints, we assume standard access control to specify who is authorized to read
and write a file using principals in access control lists. Principals are more natural
than tags in constraining access. For example, with information flow, a process that
can write to a top-level directory can also write to all sub-directories and therefore,
using tags in integrity labels alone does not always provide us with the intended
constraints (e.g., when files inside a directory should be write-protected from the
creator of the directory).
3.8.2 Boxes
Sometimes when an application sends tainted information as a parameter or return
value of a call there is a need to control when the callee (or caller, respectively)
becomes tainted by that information. For example, the tax-preparer might need to
record that it is working for Bob (so that it can send a bill later on) before it looks at
Bob's tax information and becomes contaminated with Bob's tag, which it is unable
to remove.
One way to solve this problem is to use the file system. By placing the contami-
nated information in a file and sending the pathname of the file, the caller allows the
callee to control when it becomes contaminated. Boxes provide this control without
requiring the use of persistent storage. A box has outer labels and inner labels, with
the constraint that the outer labels must be no more constraining than the inner ones.
The contaminated information is inside the box, and the receiver of the box becomes
contaminated by it only when it opens the box to obtain its contents. Figure 3-8
shows how the outer and inner labels are used to protect data they contain.
Box labels are immutable. Furthermore, there must be no sharing between the
box content and any other objects; otherwise, we could not ensure that the box's in-
ner labels accurately reflect the contamination of its content. Therefore when content
is moved into or out of a box, this requires a complete copy.
Figure 3-8: Labels on a Box
Box operations:
* CreateBox(in outerS, in outerl, in innerS, in innerl, out b): Cre-
ates a new box b with the specified labels. The box has an initial value of
NULL.
* b. Get InnerS (): Retrieves the inner secrecy label of box b.
* b .GetInnerI (): Retrieves the inner integrity label of box b.
* b. GetContents (out content): Retrieves the content of box b.
* b.PutContents(in content): Copies content into box b.
Any process can create a box using CreateBox(in outerS, in outerI,
in innerS, in innerI), which returns a new AeolusBox object. The outer labels
must be no less restrictive than the process' labels. This ensures that the existence
of the box cannot be used to convey sensitive information. Aeolus also checks that
the outer labels are no more restrictive than the inner ones. With this constraint, our
platform can simply check that the process labels allow the read of the box content
based only on the inner labels. The callee can use GetInnerS() and GetInnerI () to
find out what labels it needs in order to permit the read or write of the box content.
The callee can issue these calls if the process' labels permit the read based on the
outer labels. The outer labels are analogous to the labels on a directory and the inner
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labels are like the labels on a file inside this directory. A process can read the content
of a box using GetContents (out content). This is permitted if the process' labels
allow the read based on the inner labels of the box. Similarly, a process can write to
a box using PutContents (in content) but the process labels' must allow the write
based on the inner labels of the box.
3.8.3 Shared State
The system as described runs each process in its own private address space and allows
no sharing of volatile state; this constraint is necessary in general since otherwise it
would not be possible to ensure that process labels accurately reflect the information
they use. However, the inability for processes within an app-object to share state
is a serious limitation. We address this limitation with shared state. Shared state
provides a place where shared objects can reside. Additionally, it provides a way for
processes to synchronize and exchange messages. Each app-object has its own shared
state, and only processes in that app-object can use this shared state.
There are three forms of sharing through the shared state: shared objects, shared
queues, and shared locks. Shared objects allow the storing and retrieval of objects
(e.g., an integer value or an AeolusBox) from shared state by different processes.
Shared queues provide messaging capabilities. Shared locks enable synchroniza-
tion between processes. Like other objects in Aeolus, shared objects, shared queues
and shared locks have immutable secrecy and integrity labels.
Shared Objects
Each object in the shared state is identified by a (local) unique ID, refer to as a
SharedObjectlD. SharedObjectIDs are opaque and are known only to applications
that created them. Since processes are isolated, the shared state has a well-known
root object, named rootID, that processes can use to bootstrap communication (e.g.,
it might store a list of the IDs of other objects in the shared state). The root object
has a null secrecy and a null integrity label (i.e., only an uncontaminated process can
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write to it); its initial value is null.
Processes can create new shared objects, and retrieve and update ones stored pre-
viously. In each case, the object is copied completely between the process' heap and
the shared state.
Here are the operations on shared objects.
* Create0bject(in o, out s): Creates a new shared object that is a copy of o
in shared state and returns a new unique SharedObjectID s.
* GetObject(in s, out o): Retrieves a copy of shared state object o identified
by SharedObjectlD s.
* ReplaceObject(in s, in o): Replaces the current object associated with
SharedObjectID s with a copy of object o.
* Delete0bject (in s): Removes the shared state object associated with
SharedObjectID s.
Any process can create a new shared object using CreateObject. Aeolus returns
a new Shared0bjectID to the application and copies the object into the shared state.
The new shared object has the same secrecy and integrity labels as the process. A
process can retrieve a shared object provided the specified Shared0bj ectID exists and
the process' labels allow the read based on the object's labels. Similarly, a process
can overwrite an object using ReplaceObject but the process' labels must allow the
write. Only processes with null secrecy label can delete a shared object and the
process' integrity labels must match the object's; additionally the root object cannot
be deleted.
Shared Queues
Shared queues allow users to enqueue objects and to wait for the queue to be non-
empty.
Here are the operations on shared queues.
* CreateQueue(out q): Creates a new, empty shared queue object with the
process' labels as its secrecy and integrity labels and assigns it a new unique
SharedQueuelD q.
* Enqueue (in q, in o): Appends object o to the end of the shared queue q.
* GetQueue(in q, out o): Retrieves the first object in shared queue q and re-
moves it from the queue. If the queue is empty, returns null.
* WaitAndDequeue (in q, out o): Blocks until the shared queue q is non-empty,
returns and removes the first object in shared queue q.
* DeleteQueue (in q): Deletes shared queue q.
Any process can create a new shared queue using CreateQueue. The new shared
queue is given the process' labels. Similar to DeleteObject, only a process with a
null secrecy label can delete a shared queue and the process' integrity label must
match the queue's.
When a process appends an object to the queue, the process' labels must allow
the write based on the shared queue's labels. All remaining operations (GetQueue,
WaitAndDequeue) read and write the shared queue and hence, the process' labels
must be the same as the queue's. If several processes are waiting for a shared queue
to become non-empty, the one that has been waiting the longest is awakened when
this occurs.
Shared Locks
Although shared queues can be used to implement locks, Aeolus provides a more
direct mechanism via shared locks.
Here are the operations on shared locks.
* CreateLock(out k): Creates a new shared lock with the process' labels as its
secrecy and integrity labels and assigns it a new unique SharedLocklD k.
* Lock(in k): Attempts to obtain lock on the shared object k. If the shared lock
is locked, blocks until it is unlocked.
* Unlock(in k): Unlocks the shared lock k.
* DeleteLock(in k): Deletes shared lock k.
When a process issues a Lock operation, the process' labels must permit the read
and write based on the shared lock's labels since the process can both observe and
influence this shared state. When a process issues an Unlock, no acknowledgement
of the success or failure of the operation is returned and hence, the process' labels
must permit the write based on the shared lock's labels. Similar to DeleteObject
and DeleteQueue, a process must have null secrecy label to delete a shared lock.
3.9 External Communication
Files that the Aeolus Platform has control over are treated as components within our
system boundary since we can control the labels that go on these data and prevent
the tampering of their labels. Communication to external devices (e.g., I/O devices
such as printers) and to nodes outside the system are handled differently. Since we
cannot vouch for confidentiality of communication that passes outside the system
boundary, the communication is allowed only if the sender's secrecy label is null.
Communication from outside the boundary is given a null integrity since we cannot
vouch for its validity.
3.10 Authority State
Aeolus maintains authority state, which includes information about principals and
tags, the principal hierarchy and explicit grants, and authority closures.
3.10.1 Covert Channels
The authority state introduces opportunities for covert channels. This state is mod-
ified when privilege is granted or revoked and these modifications can be observed
through the use of privilege: a process can determine in this way whether it has been
granted privilege for some tag or not. One example is as follows. One process run-
ning as principal P1 creates a set of tags (TleakSet) and passes these tag IDs to another
process running as principal P2. These tag IDs are used for encoding a secret pro-
tected by tag T. When process with principal P1 learns about the secret, it becomes
tainted by tag T but does not have the authority to declassify. However, it could
still communicate this secret to process running with P2 if it were able to selectively
delegate authority for tags in TleakSet to P2 . The process running with principal P 2
can test which of these tags it is authoritative for and leak the secret by writing the
result to a file that does not have tag T in its secrecy label.
We avoid these channels by associating a null secrecy label with the authority
state and using information flow control. This means that modifications can be done
only by processes that have null secrecy labels. Thus, the process P cannot perform
the delegations after reading the secret. We believe this is a reasonable restriction
because modifications to the principal hierarchy are rare and don't typically occur
during normal computation. For instance, modifications to the authority state for a
medical clinic happen when a new patient joins the system but these changes happen
though special administrative actions, not as part of processing the patient records.
There is no integrity label on the authority state since the integrity of this in-
formation is guaranteed not by applications but by Aeolus. For example, we allow
explicit delegation or revocation only if the requesting process has authority for the
tag.
3.10.2 Other Operations on the Principal Hierarchy
There has been a lot of research (e.g., [33, 10]) on the structure of the principal
hierarchy and how modifications of the principal hierarchy should be controlled. For
example, the notion of ownership is a way to control who can set act-for links. While
ideas like these are valuable, they are orthogonal to our work and therefore, we don't
go into them. Additionally, we are compatible with richer structures, e.g., ownership
and tag and principal deletion. These operations affect modification of the authority
state; Aeolus is concerned with using that authority based on the current authority
state.
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Chapter 4
Programming with Aeolus
In this chapter, we present several examples of how the Aeolus programming mech-
anisms can be used to construct applications. We revisit some of our motivating
examples and see how information flow control can be applied using Aeolus.
4.1 Bob and the Tax Preparer
Authority Closure "Tax Preparer"
Authority of Panon: TaxPreparer
PrepareTaxForm(in cBox, out cForms) {
1. Update billing Info
WriteFile (BilingInfo.dat ... )
2. Read client's financial data in box
// Adjust secrecy label
AddSecrecy(cBox.GetInnerS ( )
// Read financial data in box
cTaxInfo = cBox.GetContent()
3. Call tax form generator with Ppublic
Call (Ppublic,
Compute(cTaxInfo, out cForms))
4. Declassify tax preparer's taint
Declassify (TaxProprietary)
} RETURN cForms
Billinglnfo.dat
(TaxProprietary)
TaxTables.dat
Figure 4-1: Tax Preparer Software Example
Figure 4-1 illustrates the implementation of the tax preparer example; this is
implemented as an authority closure, granted authority for the TaxProprietary tag.
TaxFormGenerator
PID: Ppublic
Compute(in taxlnfo, out cForms) {
1. Read proprietary tax info
// Adjust secrecy label
AddSecrecy (TaxProprietary)
// Read file with tax tables
fs.Read (TaxTables.dat)
2. Compute and prepare client tax forms
cForms =
} RETURN cForms
Bob's confidential financial information is sent in a box cBox, so that the tax preparer
can record the billing information (in Step 1) before it becomes contaminated. Then,
the process secrecy label is augmented so that the process can read Bob's financial
data. In Step 3, which performs a complex computation to produce the tax form,
can be done with a principal that has no authority and is invoked via a Call to run
the Compute method with Ppublic. Therefore, errors in this code can release neither
Bob's nor the tax preparer's confidential information. The Compute method raises its
secrecy label to read the proprietary tax info and returns the generated tax forms.
The caller process becomes contaminated with the TaxProprietary tag. In Step 4,
the authority closure uses its authority to declassify this tag explicitly; being explicit
forces the tax preparer to think carefully about whether it is safe to expose the
information. Finally, the code returns the resulting tax forms still contaminated by
Bob's tag so that only Bob can use it.
4.2 The Medical Clinic
Figure 4-2 shows a portion of the authority state in a medical clinic. The figure shows
the information for an individual patient, pat. Patient pat has a doctor role pat-dr
that his doctors act-for; using a role makes it convenient to have more than one doctor
and to change doctors over time. The clinic-admin also acts-for this role; this link
makes it convenient to change doctors, since we can't expect the patient to do this,
and a doctor might leave the clinic without making the necessary changes.
Patient pat-p has a personal tag, Tall-patients.pat, which is contained in the label
of all his medical records; the doctor role pat-dr is granted authority for this tag.
This tag is a sub-tag of the Tall-patients. compound tag. Tall-patients.* is created by
the clinic-admin and authority for this tag is delegated to the billing closure.
In addition, the billing closure is also authoritative for the Tbilling. tag, which it
places in the secrecy and integrity labels of all bills it produces. Placing the tag in
the secrecy label prevent unauthorized leaks of the bill, while the tag in the integrity
label ensures that the bill was produced by the closure.
O closure
O principal bob billing
- tag Tall-patients. *
-- act-for
-D- grant I IT ing
atdTalpatients.*
4.3 The Sales Analyzer
The sales analyzer is an authority closure that is directly authorized by companies
wishing to use its services. Each company maintains a tag (e.g., SalesA that appears
in the secrecy label of its sales information (e.g., SalesInfoA.dat); the sales analyzer
is given authority for this tag so that it can produce an unclassified result that the
companies can see.
Each time a new company signs up to use the sales analyzer, it needs to supply
information about where its sales information resides. When the sales analyzer runs,
it needs to find this information as well as the names of the tags delegated to it.
This can be accomplished by storingoring the needed information in a well-known place,
e.g., a Enrollment .dat file. To ensure that all needed information is supplied when
a company signs up, and is removed when it leaves, it is convenient to support the
sales analyzer with an Enrollment Manager object that provides methods to add and
remove companies and to manage what is stored in the file. This file is protected by
the Enroll tag in its integrity label and only a process running with PStatProvider has
authority for this tag. Figure 4-3 shows the tags involved in this example and how
they are used to protect the various files. Company A and Company B delegate au-
thority for their sales tag specifically to the anonymous principal of the sales analyzer
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Figure 4-3: Authority Closure in the Sales Analyzer Example
authority closure.
4.4 Job Posting Service
The job posting service is similar to Monster.com. Companies post their jobs but
want to prevent certain job seekers, e.g., current employees, from knowing about the
posting; meanwhile job seekers submit resumes, but want to prevent their identities
from being leaked to certain companies. In this example, we show how a job-seeker
can get a list of jobs that exclude the company he/she is working for. The guarantees
go both ways, the job-seeker does not know about job postings by his/her employer
and the employer does not know that the job-seeker is using this job search service.
It is easy to provide these guarantees using our platform. Each job-seeker has
a personal tag (e.g., alice-seeker) that tags his or her r4sume and this is a sub-
tag of the all-job-seekers compound tag. Also each company has a tag (e.g.,
CompanyAJobs) that marks its job descriptions. A company provides an authority
closure Match that is authorized for its tag. This authority closure compares a r4sume
Authority Closure "Sales Analyzer"
Authority of Panon: SalesA, SalesB
ComputeSalesTrend(out statSale) {
1. Read client enrollment info
ReadFile(Enrollment.dat,...)
2. For each enrolled client, read sales info
// Adjust secrecy label
AddSecrecy (SalesA)
// Read sales data
ReadFile (SalesInfoA.dat)
3. Compute statistics on all clients' sales data
statSale =.
4. Declassify clients' sales taints
Declassify (SalesA)
Declassify (SalesB)
} RETURN statSale
EnrollmentManager
PID: PStatProvider
AddClient(in cName, in cTag, in cFilePath) {
1. Add client's info to enrollment info
// Adjust integrity label
Endorse (Enroll)
// Update enrollment
WriteFile (Enrollment. dat,...)
} RETURN
RemoveClient(in cName) {
1. Remove client's info from enrollment info
// Adjust integrity label
Endorse (Enroll)
// Update enrollment
WriteFile (Enrollment.dat, ...)
} RETURN
Authority Closure "MatchJobSeeker"
Authority of Panon: all-job-seekers
MatchJobseeker(injobSeeker, outjobList) {
1. Read job-seeker's resume
// Adjust secrecy label
AddSecrecy (alice-seeker)
// Read job-seeker's resume file
ReadFile (AliceResume.dat, ...)
2. For each company not j obSeeker. employer
Check whether job-seeker qualifies for jobs
// Invoke company X's closure
CallClosure (X,
Match(resume, out jobPosts))
// Add list of qualified jobs
jobList .Add (jobPosts)
3. Declassify top-level job seeker tag
Declassify (all-job-seekers)
} RETURN jobList
Resumes of Job Seekers
alice-seeker) bobseeker)
AliceResume.dat BobResume.dat
Authority Closure "Match"
Authority of PanonB: CompanyBJobs
--N Authority Closure "Match"
Authority of PanonA: CompanyAJobs
Match(in resume, outjobPosts) {
1. Read job descriptions
// Adjust secrecy label
AddSecrecy (CompanyAJobs)
// Read job file
ReadFile (JobA.dat, ...)
2. For each job description,
Check requirements and return the
ones that match
jobPosts ...
3. Declassify company's tag
Declassify (CompanyAJobs)
} RETURN jobPosts
Job Descriptions from Companies
j CompanyAJobs) CompanyBJobs)
JobA.dat JobB.dat
Figure 4-4: Job Posting Service Example
to its job descriptions and returns the descriptions that the seeker qualifies for.
The job posting service provides an authority closure MatchJobSeeker that is
authorized for the compound all-job-seekers tag as shown in Figure 4-4. A job
seeker invokes this authority closure to get a list of jobs that he/she qualifies for. This
authority closure calls company Match closures if the job-seeker does not work for the
company and passes them the job-seeker's resume as an argument. Each company
closure uses its authority for the company tag to declassify the matching descriptions,
however, the company cannot leak the r4sume since the process is tagged with the
job-seeker's tag. On the other hand, the MatchJobSeeker closure can remove this
tag and send the result over the network to the poster of the resume.
4.5 Online Store
The final example concerns a web service that supports online purchases; the example
in Figure 4-5 illustrates the use of shared volatile state. A customer engages in a
session consisting of a series of interactions during which he examines available items
and adds them to his shopping cart; at the end, he either loses interest or proceeds
to buy the items. The service has many millions of customers with many thousands
of simultaneously active sessions. To handle the load, it uses multiple servers. A call
made during a session will return to the same server as the previous call, but if the
server is unavailable, some other server can be used.
Online Store Web Service
PID: Run as caller's principal (e.g., PAlice)
UpdateShoppingCart(in cookie, in newltem) {
1. Update access time for this session
state.ReplaceObject (cookie.metaId,
Time.Now ( )
2. Retrieve user session state
AddSecrecy (cookie. userTag)
cart = state.GetObject (cookie.dataId)
3. Add item to shopping cart in box
state.ReplaceObject (cookie.datald,
cart. Add (newItem))
} RETURN
Garbage Collector
PID: PStoreA
CleanupSessionStateO {
List<cookies> activeSessions
1. Read shared state IDs of allocated sessions' metadata
// Read and add newly allocated cookies
state.GetQueue (sessionQueueId,...}
// Retrieve access time of session
foreach(cookie in activeSessions)
state.GetObject (. .cookie.metaId.. }
2. For sessions that have timed out,
Delete session user data and metadata
state .DeleteBox (4127293)
state .DeleteBox (4852532)
I RETURN
Shared Boxes
rootlD = 2817622
ID = 4852532
Ls= 0
access time
for
ID 4127293
ID = 3373729
ID = 4127293
Ls= AliceShopping
Alice's cart
ID = 8126473
Figure 4-5: Online Store Example
Session Creation
PID: Run as caller's principal (e.g., PAlice)
CreateSession(in userTag, out cookie) {
1. Create user session metadata shared state
cookie.metaId =
state. CreateObject ()
cookie.userTag = userTag
2. Increase the secrecy to protect cookie
AddSecrecy (userTag)
3. Create user session data shared state (S=userTag)
cookie.dataId =
state. CreateObj ect ()
4. Update allocated sessions
state.Enqueue (sessionQueueId, cookie)
} RETURN cookie
Shared Queues
ID = 1127116 (Session Queue ID)
Ls = 0
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Information about a customer is marked by a unique customer tag (e.g.,
AliceShopping) and a customer's session state is stored at a file server that is part
of the system in a file whose secrecy label contains the customer tag. Additionally,
the state is stored in the shared state at the server where the request is handled. The
server will obtain the customer's session information from its shared state if possible;
otherwise it reads the file.
The online store application has a process for each customer request currently
being processed, and another process that performs garbage collection on session
state. When this application is started at the server, it creates a shared queue and
stores its ID in the root object. This queue is used to communicate the creation and
termination of sessions to the Garbage Collector.
This application requires a way to remove information about abandoned sessions
from the volatile state at the servers. This is accomplished by the Garbage Collector
process; it periodically examines the allocated sessions and deletes information about
those that have been inactive for too long. The garbage collector process is notified
about new sessions and session termination through the queue.
When a session starts up, the process handling the request creates two objects in
shared state. The first contains the session information and has a secrecy label that
contains the customer tag. The second is a metadata object; it contains the ID of the
session object, and also records the time of the most recent request processed for this
session. The metadata object has a null secrecy label. The request handling process
then notifies the garbage collector process about the new session by enqueuing an
entry containing the ID of the metadata object on the queue. When the request
processing is complete, the request handling process stores the ID of the metadata
object for the session in the cookie that it returns to the user.
Subsequent requests from the customer such as UpdateShoppingCart will include
the cookie and the cookie is used to retrieve the customer's session state from our
shared state. Processing this request will cause the process to become contaminated
by the user tag, but before this happens the request handler process updates the
metadata object for the session to reflect the current time.
The garbage collector process maintains a list in which it stores the IDs of the
metadata objects for active sessions. It removes sessions from this list when informed
about their termination: when it does this, it deletes both the metadata and session
objects for that session. In addition, it cycles through the list periodically to identify
idle sessions and discards the information for them. The garbage collector is able
to do this work without becoming contaminated by the user tags because it never
examines the session objects; instead it only looks at the metadata objects.
An alternative structure is to give the garbage collector authority for the user
tags; a compound tag could be used for this. With this structure there would be
only one shared state object per session, since there is no need to protect the garbage
collector from being contaminated. However, the structure described above is safer
because the garbage collector process can run without any authority and therefore
there is no danger that it will leak information even if it contains an error.
Chapter 5
Distributed Computing Platform
The Aeolus Platform is a distributed computing platform that implements our pro-
gramming model. Developers can deploy applications on this platform and it guaran-
tees that their computations and data are protected by our information flow control.
The platform is designed to support the abstraction and level of control our program-
ming model requires.
5.1 Approach
The Aeolus Platform refers to the collection of platform components that run lo-
cally and remotely. Figure 5-1 shows the high-level architecture of the platform.
Applications run on compute nodes and sensitive data are stored on storage nodes.
Compute nodes enforce information flow guarantees as user applications execute.
Storage nodes provide access to file systems that support the Aeolus interface. Com-
pute nodes within our platform consult the shared authority state managed by the
authority server to determine whether privileged operations should be allowed. A
compute node and a storage node may co-exist on the same machine or they may be
on different machines.
Each compute node runs a set of platform instances (PIs). A platform instance is
associated with each app-object running on Aeolus. In addition, there is an Authority
State Client running on each compute node that manages all interactions with the
Aeolus Plafom
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Figure 5-1: High-Level Architecture of Aeolus Distributed Computing Platform
authority server. A platform instance provides a way to sandbox the user application
so that the application has no direct accesses to resources (e.g., files, remote calls,
I/Os). Instead access to resources must go through our platform, which allows us to
ensure that the Aeolus rules are followed.
5.1.1 Isolation
Our platform targets applications that are written in languages such as Java and
C#. Programs written in these languages run within a virtual machine such as
the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) [61] or the Microsoft .NET Common Language
Runtime (CLR) [3]. Our prototype is implemented on top of the .NET Framework
but similar design concepts can be applied to Java. We use the isolation properties of
these language runtimes to provide sandboxing capabilities in a platform instance. In
particular, we use .NET application domains (appDomains) to limit the permissions
of user code. Furthermore, each application domain has its own address space with
no sharing between application domains.
Within each platform instance, as shown in Figure 5-2, there is one Aeolus System
appDomain (SYS-d) and many user appDomains (USER-d). User code is executed
in a USER-d, which has restricted access, while the SYS-d has full permissions to
resources. User applications must use the SYS-d to obtain access to various resources.
The Aeolus SYS-d appDomain provides:
* a launcher that starts up user appDomains
* Aeolus internal state for each user appDomain
* access to shared state
* access to resources such as the file system
Figure 5-2: Inside a Compute Node
An application domain is an abstraction provided by the language runtime. The
language runtime takes advantage of type-safety and memory-safety to allow multiple
appDomains to exist within a single OS process. Type-safety ensures, for example,
that a program cannot construct an integer value that corresponds to a target address
and use it as a pointer to refer to an arbitrary location in memory. Memory-safety
guarantees that programs cannot access memory outside of properly allocated objects.
Our platform relies on application domains for isolation and therefore, it supports only
code that adheres to these language safety properties.
5.1.2 Proxy Object
User appDomains have no access to system resources. Instead each USER-d is pro-
vided (when it is launched) with a proxy object (PO), which provides methods it can
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call to interact with Aeolus. The proxy object exposes the Aeolus API (details in
Appendix A). It has methods for all Aeolus functions and all external accesses: mod-
ifications of the authority state, manipulations of labels, accesses to shared state, file
use, I/O devices. In the case of files and I/O devices, the PO provides wrapper code
that ensures the information flow rules are obeyed, while using lower level services
(e.g., a printer driver to access the real device).
Some calls to the PO involve an inter-appDomain call to the SYS-d, for example,
to write to I/O devices since a USER-d has no such permission. Communication
from a USER-d to the SYS-d is relatively lightweight. AppDomains communicate
with each other via message passing in much the same way as other IPC mechanisms
(i.e., marshaling and un-marshaling of values); however, they do not cross OS process
boundaries and hence are much cheaper than OS process communication.
Figure 5-3: Aeolus Platform Instance
Figure 5-3 shows an Aeolus Platform Instance with three user appDomains. Each
proxy object stores the process' information flow state (principal ID, process labels)
in the USER-d and relies on type-checking and encapsulation to ensure that this state
is not misused. The proxy objects can communicate with the SYS-d. The SYS-d can
interact with the shared state and the authority state client on the compute node and
can access resources both within and outside the Aeolus system boundary.
5.2 Access and Use of Authority State
The proxy object provides methods to accomplish label manipulations and also dele-
gations and revocations. Delegations and revocations require updating the authority
state at the authority server. Privileged label manipulations require lookup opera-
tions to check whether the process' principal has authority for the tag in question.
The SYS-d consults the authority state client for both authority updates and lookups
on behalf of the proxy object.
In the case of authority updates, the proxy object checks the information flow
state of the process and ensures that the process has a null secrecy label. Then it
relays the update request to the SYS-d, which passes it on to the authority state
client. The authority state client communicates with the remote authority server
to perform the update. Authority lookups may be served locally using information
cached by the authority state client and if the needed authority information is not
cached, the authority state client retrieves it from the authority server. The authority
state client is discussed in Section 5.11.
5.3 Boxes
Boxes allow sensitive data to pass around different parts of an application without
increasing the restriction on a process' information flow state unless the content of
the box is accessed.
To provide such a functionality, Aeolus needs to control accesses to box content.
Our approach is to rely on type-safety by treating boxes as an abstract data type
(AeolusBox) with access methods that enforce our information flow rules described
previously in Section 3.8.2. Hence, boxes can reside in the user appDomain. Appli-
cation developers use the proxy object to create a new box, specifying the outer and
inner labels of this box. Our platform code generates a new AeolusBox object in
the user appDomain. Content can be put into a box using the object's PutContent
method, which checks the process' labels and the box labels before permitting the
operation. Similarly, the content can be retrieved using the object's GetContent
method. These methods do a complete copy by serializing the box contents. This
way, we ensure no sharing and therefore, no modifications can be made to box con-
tent without going through our checks in these methods. A process can also use
GetInnerS and GetInnerI to retrieve the inner labels of the box and Aeolus checks
the process' labels against the outer labels before returning the values.
5.4 Shared State
Shared State is implemented by a Shared State Manager that resides within each
SYS-d (see Figure 5-3). The shared state manager allocates memory for the shared
state and manages accesses to it.
A user application uses the proxy object to create a shared object, queue or lock.
This causes an inter-appDomain call to be made from the USER-d of the PO to the
shared state manager in the SYS-d. The shared state manager manages the ID space
of these objects and returns a new randomly generated ID to the application.
For requests that involve the read and write of a shared object or shared queue
entry, a copy of the object to be stored or retrieved is passed across an application
domain boundary.
Shared queues are implemented using separate monitors and locks for each queue.
Enqueue requests are non-blocking and a copy of the input object is appended to the
queue. When the queue is empty, dequeue requests are queued internally. An enqueue
request notifies the first requester on this internal wait queue. Dequeue requests are
blocking and returns only when notified. Each dequeue request waits in a different
thread to avoid blocking the shared state manager.
Similarly, shared locks are implemented using separate monitors for each lock.
The shared state manager blocks a caller's request if the shared lock is locked. When
it becomes unlocked, the first caller waiting acquires the lock.
5.5 Files
An Aeolus file system runs a layer of Aeolus platform code (Aeolus FS) that manages
metadata such as file labels to keep track of and protect the storage of sensitive user
data.
5.5.1 Aeolus File System
Some previous research projects (e.g., [50, 35]) have tied their design to particular op-
erating system and file system implementations, for example, by using the extended
attribute fields of files in Linux-based file systems to encode additional security infor-
mation. One of our design goals is to be able to support a wide range of file system
implementations. Furthermore, we want to focus on understanding how application
developers make use of common file system interfaces after the introduction of tags
and labels. To that end, our design does not make assumptions about the support
available in existing file systems to allow us to annotate files/directories and specify
access checks. Instead, we provide a proxy solution that allows us to manage our own
metadata while interfacing to different file system implementations.
The Aeolus FS is a TCP server that handles file system operations such as
CreateFile and WriteFile. For each file and directory, the Aeolus FS needs to
keep track of its secrecy and integrity labels. These labels are kept as Aeolus meta-
data and are stored in a relation in a database while the actual file content is stored
in the file system. For each directory and file, an entry of the form (file path,
secrecy label, integrity label) is entered into the database. The file path is
the full file path from the application user's perspective. Files and directories have
immutable labels and these are kept in the secrecy label and integrity label
fields.
Figure 5-4: Aeolus File System
Figure 5-4 shows how a file operation such as WriteFile is handled in Aeolus.
The Aeolus proxy object relays the file access request locally to the SYS-d. The SYS-
d connects with the appropriate Aeolus FS TCP server responsible for the specified
file system (e.g., /data. csail.mit. edu/ is handled by Aeolus TCP server at port
8400 on the machine with IP address data. csail .mit .edu). This request from the
SYS-d is annotated with the information flow state (process' labels) of the executing
user code. The Aeolus FS TCP server retrieves the relevant label metadata from the
database and uses this information flow state to determine whether the file operation
should be permitted. If the request passes the label checks, the Aeolus FS updates
the actual file content as a client of the underlying file system. Notice that the imple-
mentation of the Aeolus FS TCP server is decoupled from the underlying file system
storing the user data. The underlying file system is oblivious to the information flow
concerns. This allows our system to support file systems ranging from block-based
NFS to proprietary file systems.
In our research prototype, we implemented an Aeolus FS for Windows NTFS.
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The Aeolus FS TCP server is co-located with the underlying OS file system. This
TCP server acts as a FS client to NTFS. It uses the IO. File library to perform file
system administrative operations and for reading and writing entire files, and uses
the IO. Filestream library for creating and operating with file-streams.
With the way the information flow checks are set up, most of these file operations
that read and write an entire file require only a single check of the process' labels
against the file's. Similarly, file maintenance operations such as Create and Delete
require a comparison of the process' labels with those of the parent directory. File
labels are cheap to retrieve in our design. The full file path is stored in our metadata
database. An index is generated on this attribute, which allows 0(1) retrieval of label
information based on file path. A traversal of the directory tree is not necessary.
5.5.2 File-streams
Aeolus also provides file-streams, in which the file is read or written in multiple
chunks. Application developers use the proxy object to open a file-stream and Ae-
olus returns an AeolusFilestream object. During this operation, the proxy object
contacts the SYS-d, which opens the file-stream to the remote file server with the
specified access mode and maintains the file handle for this file-stream. The returned
AeolusFilestream object contains a specific ID in its private fields that the SYS-d
can use to refer to this file handle. The application can then issue read and write
methods associated with this object.
As discussed in Section 3.8.1, a change to the process state can render an opened
file-stream unusable. The straightforward implementation of a file-stream involves
checking at each use of the file-stream. This checking involves: the comparison of
the process' labels with the file labels, plus in the case of a writeable file-stream,
checking against any automatic declassifications and endorsements indicated when
the file-stream was opened. However, like Flume [35], we avoid these checks most of
the time.
Once a file-stream is opened, Flume performs checks during process label changes
and forbids changes that will make the file-stream unusable. We take a different
approach and perform checking of file-stream operations. In this way, we associate
any such information flow violations with the file-stream operations rather than the
process label changes. Thus, the process can change its labels freely provided that
at the next file-stream operation, the process labels pass the required check. Such
deferred checks can improve performance if the file-stream is no longer used after this
state change.
To minimize the label checking required for file-stream reads and writes, we asso-
ciate a check bit with file-streams. When a file-stream is opened, the label checks are
done and the check bit is set to false. As long as this bit is false, no label checks are
needed for subsequent reads and writes. However, if there is a change in either the
process labels or the process authority, the bit is turned on, thus ensuring that the
check happens at the next file-stream access so that the appropriate exception can
be raised if necessary. If in fact the access is allowed at that point, we turn the bit
off. Table 5.1 shows the conditions for setting this bit.
Table 5.1: Conditions for Setting Check bit of a File-stream
Readable File-stream Writeable File-stream
Declassify AddSecrecy
Endorse RemoveIntegrity
Change process' principal Change process' principal
5.6 Other I/O
A typical I/O device is outside our system boundary. An example of one such device
is the native local file system (not running Aeolus FS) that stores files on disks at
the compute node. User applications do not have direct access to these file systems;
otherwise, sensitive data would be stored to these files and made accessible by any
program. A user application runs within a USER-d and is prevented from making
these I/O requests.
Access to input devices can be allowed if the process' integrity label is null and
access to an output device can be allowed if the process' secrecy is null. This ensures
that secrets cannot be leaked and high-integrity process cannot be influenced by low
integrity input data.
To support the local file system, we expose the common file system interfaces such
as I0. File and IO.Filestream to the user application in the Aeolus proxy object,
which relays the request to the SYS-d. The SYS-d will check that these file operations
are performed only when the process has a null secrecy label for writes and a null
integrity for reads.
Similarly, support for other devices can be done by exposing the device user in-
terface in the Aeolus proxy object and using the SYS-d to perform label checks prior
to issuing the I/O request on the real device.
5.7 Local Forks
Applications running in a USER-d can request a Fork on the proxy object. The user
application specifies the method to invoke and optionally the PID of the principal,
the secrecy and integrity tags that it wants to apply declassification and endorsement
to. This method is specified by passing an object (derived from the AeolusCallable
abstract class) that has a special Invoke method (e.g., o.Invoke(), returns nothing).
The Fork request is handled in SYS-d. Our platform checks that the current
process' labels and PID allow the Fork to be made without any information flow
violation.
If there are no violations, a new USER-d is set up to run the specified method.
Since such setup can be costly, SYS-d maintains a pool of inactive user appDomains,
as shown in Figure 5-5. It selects an inactive user appDomain from this pool and sets
the information flow state of this USER-d to the specified PID and process' labels.
The object with the Invoke method is then serialized and copied to this USER-d.
(Any arguments for the method invocation are included as part of the object.) Finally,
the Invoke method starts running in a separate USER-d.
Since user appDomains are reused, our platform must ensure that there is no
Active USER-d AppDomnain Pool (Inactive USER-d)| USER-d
USER-d
User Code
App Assemblies
Figure 5-5: User AppDomains
sharing with previous invocations of code in the same USER-d. Hence, in our current
prototype, user applications cannot have static variables and our platform checks
against this using .NET reflection prior to loading user code into an appDomain.
5.8 Local Calls
Application developers can also run code with different authority by issuing a Call
on the proxy object. Similar to a Fork, the user application passes the method via an
AeolusCallable object and specifies the PID that it wants to run the method with.
A call runs in the same address space and our platform checks for the same
information flow violations as a Fork. If there are no violations, the proxy object
saves the PID of the caller and issues the Invoke method on the object. At the end
of the execution, the proxy object restores the PID to that of the caller. Since a
call returns to the caller, our system updates the caller process' labels to reflect any
additional contamination picked up during the call (i.e., the process label is union-ed
with the secrecy label of the caller's and the process label is intersected with the
integrity of the caller's).
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5.9 Authority Closures
Authority closures are similar to local forks in that they start executing a new method
in a different USER-d. However, they run with the anonymous principal ID associated
with the closure. The proxy object ensures that the proper code and principal are
used.
Recall that an authority closure is identified by a closure ID. When the application
makes a closure call, it supplies the closure ID and the method to be invoked via an
AeolusClosureCallable object. The closure identified by the ID is bound to a key
and an anonymous principal and the ID is used for looking up these values. The
anonymous principal is used by the platform to identify the authority that has been
given to the closure. The key is used to verify the authenticity of the code.
Within each platform instance, the SYS-d has a mapping of closure IDs to (pid,
key) pairs. The pid and key values are obtained from the authority state client. After
this lookup, our platform must check that the specified code is signed by this key.
All closure code is protected and signed by private-public key pairs. Our platform
must verify that the method the application wants to invoke is signed by the proper
key. This checking can be computationally expensive if done at the time of the closure
call. We minimize this cost by taking advantage of the strong name property and
reflection in .NET to implement this.
One or more class libraries can be compiled into a .NET assembly. This assembly
can be signed with a private key at compile time and in doing so, a strong name
is associated with it. A strong name consists of the assembly's text name, a public
key, a version number and optional build information. To get a valid strong name,
an assembly is strong-name signed during the build process; this is done by using
RSA to encrypt the SHA1 hash of the assembly [17] with the public-private key pair
of the code publisher. We use this public key in the strong name as the key for
Aeolus authority closures. Therefore, all authority closure code must be packaged
into assemblies with strong names.
When a strong-name assembly is loaded, .NET computes the hash of the assembly
and checks it against the certificate signed by the code publisher. Therefore, our
platform can safely refer to the public key of the strong name to confirm that the
code is authenticated by the expected key. Figure 5-6 shows the structure of a strong-
name signed assembly that contains the authority closure code for the code object
and how its strong name and certificate are used for the checking.
F
Strong-Named Assembly(HelloWorldLib.dl)
: HelloWorldLib Code:
Authority Closure Code
I Class HelloWad:
I . AeolusClosureCallable
I Assembly Info:
Strong Name
Name = HelloWorldLib
Version= 1.0.0.0
PublicKey = ffa52ed9739048b4
Certificate
AssemblyHash signed by public key
----- ,------------------
Figure 5-6: Using Strong Name to Verify Authority Closure Code
The proxy object looks up the strong name of the supplied AeolusClosureCallable
code object using .NET reflection. It checks that the public key in the strong name
is the same as the key from the closure ID mapping. After this check, it starts:the
Invoke method in a new USER-d but with process' principal set to the anonymous
principal from the closure ID mapping. Similar to fork and call, the caller can also
specify the list of tags to apply declassification and endorsement to the labels for
the closure. The proxy object checks that the caller principal has authority for these
tags. At the end of the closure call, the result object is returned and caller's labels
are updated to reflect any additional contamination as a result of the closure call.
5.10 Remote Procedure Calls
Aeolus supports one form of remote procedure calls called web methods. Like other
remote procedure call mechanisms, web methods allow a client to call a method
that is on another node. In our prototype, we allow user applications to invoke web
methods only on compute nodes that are within our system. Our platform ensures
that the web method is executed with the appropriate principal and process labels
to preserve information flow properties. Hence, we need to communicate information
flow state and mediate the web method call between the client and server compute
nodes. Our approach is to tap into the messaging framework and web method runtime
environment and take advantage of their programming hooks and callbacks.
Web methods are exposed by application servers using a common description lan-
guage called the Web Service Description Language (WSDL) [42], established by the
World Wide Web Consortium. Web methods are invoked over HTTP and are hosted
by an HTTP server such as the Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS). They
use the Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) to encode call arguments and return
values. SOAP is a XML-based protocol that lets applications exchange information
over the Internet. At the remote machine, the HTTP server passes the SOAP message
to the language runtime, which de-serializes the message and invokes the web method.
Aeolus taps into the programming hooks in the serialization and de-serialization of
SOAP messages at the client and server to inject and retrieve information flow state
for the call and return. Our platform code also taps into the dispatching logic for web
method invocations on the server-side to control their invocations. Next, we present
a step-by-step walk-through of a web method invocation on our platform.
Applications include references to the web service (set of web methods) they want
to invoke. This reference is a URL pointing to the web service interface. From the
application's perspective, a web service is a remote object that contains a set of web
methods. (However, these web methods are often independent, stateless, and atomic.)
Figure 5-7 shows how a web method invocation is handled in our system. On the
client side, to a user application, invoking an Aeolus web method seems no different
from invoking a normal web method.
In Step 1, a remote call is routed to the .NET web service runtime. The .NET web
service runtime handles the serialization and de-serialization of messages to/from the
web service and Aeolus registers several callback functions on these message events.
Compute Node A (Web Service Client)
Restricted AppDomains
.NET Web Service Runtime
URLs of Web Services
within Aeolus System
* SOAP interceptor
GetlnfoFlowStateo
Unrestricted AppDomain (SYS-d)
Platform code
Compute Node B (Web Service Server)
IIS
(HTTP Server)
i ET Web Service Runtime
SOAP Interceptor
Dispatcher
j SetnfoFlowState0
Figure 5-7: Web Method Invocation on Aeolus Platform
When Aeolus receives an outgoing message, it checks that the message is destined
for a node within our system. Aeolus does this by consulting a list in SYS-d that
includes the IP address and public key associated with each trusted node within our
system. This information is part of the authority state and the public key is the basis
for creating an SSL connection between nodes within our system. Then, the remote
method call is serialized into a SOAP message and Aeolus attaches an Information
Flow State Header containing the principal ID, and secrecy and integrity labels of
the caller to the message in Step 2. This extended message is sent over HTTP to the
remote web service server in Step 3.
The HTTP server at the remote machine processes the incoming network request
and directs it to the server-side .NET web service runtime in Step 4. This runtime is
responsible for dispatching requests to the web service implementation. A web service
implementation that runs on the Aeolus platform must wrap the user implementation
with our platform code to control how the user web method is executed. In our
current prototype, this is done manually by taking in the user implementation as
a class library and creating a Service Call Proxy that has call stubs for the user
methods. Each call stub wraps the user method with platform setup and teardown
code. The Service Call Proxy is deployed as a web service on the server. When
this web service runtime receives the SOAP message at the server in Step 5, the SOAP
interceptor first checks that the message comes from a node within our system. Then
it extracts the Information Flow State Header attached to the message. In Step
6, the web service dispatcher relays the call to the Aeolus Service Call Proxy with
the needed information flow state to execute the web method. Our platform code
selects an unused USER-d from a pool of user appDomains and initializes it with the
caller's information flow state. The user web method is invoked and when it finishes
execution, the process' information flow state is extracted and sent back to the client
in an Information Flow State Header along with the message containing the call
return value. The SOAP interceptor on the client retrieves this header and updates
the caller process' information flow state accordingly.
In our prototype, we limited remote calls to nodes within our system. However,
this can be extended to handle calls from nodes outside by running the remote method
with Ppublic. If the caller is outside our system, the code must run with null integrity
label and can only return to the caller if it has a null secrecy label. If the callee is
outside our system, Aeolus will only allow the call to be made if the caller process
has a null secrecy label and upon its return, the callee will have a null integrity label.
5.11 Authority Management
So far, we have discussed how our platform can monitor data channels and track
information flow. Platform instances use authority state to determine whether privi-
leged operations should be allowed. Management of authority state is an important
part of the system.
We expect lookups of authority information to be frequent whereas updates occur
relatively rarely. Lookups are part of the normal execution of an application and
happen as data are declassified or endorsed. Updates occur primarily as new princi-
pals are added or removed, for example, when a doctor leaves the clinic, and during
re-assignment of responsibility, for example, when a patient is assigned a different
doctor.
The Aeolus platform is intended to support many compute nodes from differ-
ent organizations/institutions, hosted on different and geographically dispersed data
centers. With roughly 10,000 nodes per data center and many applications running
simultaneously on each node, this can result in millions of authority lookup requests
per second. A design in which authority is checked by a centralized authority server
is infeasible with this high aggregate number of authority lookups. Not only does
this central authority server need to serve many compute nodes, but the computa-
tion needed to check authority can be time-consuming, requiring the traversal of the
principal hierarchy and per-principal authority state to determine whether principal
P indeed has authority for tag T.
Also, authority lookups can be in the critical path of application execution. For
example, prior to writing data to a file, the application may need to make its secrecy
label less restrictive by calling Declassify. The application cannot proceed until the
process' secrecy label has been updated. To do so, the Aeolus PI needs to check that
the running principal has authority for the specified tag.
Our approach is to handle authority updates and lookups separately. Our archi-
tecture consists of authority server(s) that handle updates and authority state clients
on compute nodes that maintain cached state to serve lookups. Most lookups are
handled locally. This approach reduces latency in looking up authority information
and reduces load on the AS.
Authority state is stored persistently at the AS. In our prototype, we use one
server, however, we can replicate the authority state on a group of servers to provide
high reliability and availability. Furthermore, we can partition the authority state
among many ASes. Each authority server could be responsible for one independent
part of the authority state to reduce the chance of conflicting updates. An authority
server could also be kept close to where it might be likely used. We plan to explore
these approaches as future work.
5.11.1 Structure of the Authority State
This section describes how we store authority state at the authority server (AS).
In Aeolus, authority state includes information about tags and principals, the prin-
cipal hierarchy, delegations that have been granted to different principals, authority
closures, and system membership. This authority state is needed to determine not
only whether a principal has authority for a tag but also to find actors and actees
of principals. The authority state must have sufficient information to capture these
decisions.
The authority state is stored in several tables. Table 5.2 shows the attributes
maintained by each of these data tables.
Table 5.2: Authority State Data Tables
Principal Table
Pid: Principal ID
Tag Table
Tid: Tag ID
ActFor Table
PidFrom: Principal ID of Actor
PidTo: Principal ID of Actee
Grant Table
PidFrom: Principal ID of Grantor
PidTo: Principal ID of Grantee
Tag: Tag granted
Closure Table
Cid: Closure ID
Key: Public key used to verify closure code
Pid: Anonymous Principal ID
Membership Table
Node: Node identifier
IP address: Assigned static IP address of node
Public Key: Public key
The Principal Table and Tag Table are used to identify valid tags and princi-
pals in the system and the principals that created them. The ActFor Table encodes
the principal hierarchy by listing all the edges of this directed acyclic graph connect-
ing actor principal (PidFrom) to actee principal (PidTo). The Grant Table encodes
delegations by listing all edges in the delegation chain for specific tags.
The ActFor Table represents implicit authority whereas the Grant Table rep-
resents explicit authority. To determine whether a principal P has authority for a
tag T, one uses the ActFor Table to traverse the links, starting with P in PidFrom
and retrieving all actees of principal P. For each of these actees, one can then use
the Grant Table to compute the tags that this actee is directly authoritative for and
check whether T is in this set. The set of explicit authority for a principal consists
of all the tags in which the principal is the grantee in the Grant Table.
When a principal creates another principal, the new principal ID is recorded in
the Principal Table and since the creator principal automatically acts-for the new
principal, a link is added in the ActFor Table. When a principal creates a tag, the
new tag ID is recorded in the Tag Table and the creator principal is automatically
granted authority for the tag. This is done by creating a new entry granting the
creator principal the authority for this tag (with the system principal Proot as the
grantor principal) in the Grant Table.
Revocation causes entries to be removed from these tables. When a delegation is
revoked, this will affect delegations made transitively. For example, if principal P
granted tag T to principal P2 and then P2 grants this to principal P3 , there will be
two entries in the Grant Table: {PI, P2, T} and {P 2, P3, T}. When P1 decides to
revoke the delegation of tag T to P2 , the first entry is removed. We also remove the
second entry if P2 has no other delegations for tag T. In this way, the Grant Table
is kept up-to-date; we can retrieve a principal's explicit authority by simply reading
this table and do not have to check whether the delegation is still valid.
When an act-for link is revoked, we remove the corresponding entry in the ActFor
Table. Since implicit authority is computed dynamically, other links in this table are
not affected.
Our system provides random IDs for principals, tags and authority closures. Tags
are encoded as a pair of IDs: (ID1, ID2). Top-level tags have a unique ID for ID1 and
a 0 for ID2. Sub-tags have ID1 of the compound tag they belong to and a non-zero
unique ID2. This way, we are able to represent groups of tags without having to
maintain explicit data structures for them.
The Membership Table maintains the list of machines that are trusted to be
running Aeolus. The Node attribute represents the globally unique identifier of the
machine. The entry also includes the static IP address assigned to this node and its
public key.
5.11.2 Caching
We maintain cached authority state at authority state clients on compute nodes. Use
of cached state offloads the AS and speeds up the processing of operations. However,
we need to partition the authority state effectively for reasonable cache performance.
Partitioning Authority State
At one extreme, authority state clients can obtain and cache the entire authority
state. In this way, they have a complete copy. However, authority state of the entire
system can be large since it includes information on all principals and tags in the
system, across many organizational departments and institutions. We want Aeolus to
be able to run on compute nodes with a wide range of hardware resources including
mobile devices, which are becoming popular entry points for invoking distributed
computations [25]. The authority state of the system may not fit on devices with small
memory capacity. Moreover, transferring the entire state can be time-consuming.
We need to partition the state effectively to get a reasonable tradeoff between
minimizing the number of fetches required over time and the size of each fetch. The
partitioning requirement is the usual one: a fetch should bring over related informa-
tion that is likely to be useful in the future.
Our solution is to divide the authority state into cores. Each time a client requests
some information from the AS, it receives a core. Additionally, we give the application
a way to control which core information goes into. When a principal is created, the
caller can indicate whether it should go into a new core or an existing one. In the
latter case, the caller can specify the core by providing a PID as an extra argument;
the new principal will be placed in that principal's core, or in the core of the caller's
principal if the argument is missing. Tags and closures always go into some principal's
core; again there is an optional argument to specify the principal and if the argument
is omitted, the tag or closure goes into the core of the creator's principal.
A core stores not only all principals, tags, and closures that have been placed in
it, but also all the acts-for and delegations for these principals. In addition, it stores
sufficient information to follow acts-for links to principals that reside in other cores.
Figure 5-8 shows the clinic example discussed before and how the principals and tags
are grouped into cores. The figure shows a patient core and a doctor core for the
doctor dr-bob who acts-for the patient's doctor role pat-dr. The figure also shows
the clinic core. This core would have been created when the clinic system started
running and contains various entities related to managing the clinic, including (for this
example) the clinic-admin principal, the billing closure, and the all-patients
compound tag. The figure omits a link between the all-patients tag and its sub-
tag, pat-tag) since this information is not stored explicitly but instead is captured
through tag names.
This partitioned authority state is implemented using the same tables as Table 5.2
but each entry has an additional attribute that identifies the core that a table entry
belongs to. A core consists of all entries from all data tables that have the same
CoreId and is used as the unit for a fetch. The ActFor Table and Grant Table
contain additional attributes (shown in bold font in Table 5.3) on how to find the
cores of the principal that they are linked or chained to. The Membership Table is
not partitioned since its information is made available to all authority state clients.
An authority state client fetches an entire core from the AS each time. When a
core is fetched, the authority state client receives all table entries with the requested
core ID in CoreId and stores them locally in in-memory tables structured like the
0 closure
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Figure 5-8: Structure of Core for Medical Clinic Example
Table 5.3: Partitioning Authority State Data Tables by Cores
Principal Table
Coreld: Core ID
Pid: Principal ID
Tag Table
Coreld: Core ID
Tid: Tag ID
ActFor Table
Coreld: Core ID (core of Actor)
CoreTo: Core ID (core of Actee)
PidFrom: Principal ID of Actor
PidTo: Principal ID of Actee
Grant Table
CoreId: Core ID (core of Grantee)
CoreFrom: Core ID (core of Grantor)
PidFrom: Principal ID of Grantor
PidTo: Principal ID of Grantee
Tag: Tag granted
Closure Table
Coreld: Core ID
Cid: Closure ID
Key: Public key used to verify closure code
Pid: Anonymous Principal ID
ones at the AS.
When an user application performs a privileged operation that asks whether prin-
cipal P has authority for tag T, this may require fetching multiple cores. Figure 5-9
shows a sample traversal that spans two cores. Assuming that the authority state
client at the compute node has neither core cached, when it is asked the question
HasAuthority(P, T), it first checks whether it has information on principal P by
consulting its cached Principal Table. If P is not found and since it doesn't have
any information about this principal (i.e., it doesn't know which core P belongs to),
it issues a special request to the authority server to FetchCoreForPrincipal(P).
The authority server has the complete authority state and can look up the core of
principal P and in this example, it will return Core C1. Then, the authority lookup
continues exploring the principals that P acts-for by using the local ActFor Table.
When it finds an actee principal, it checks the CoreTo attribute to see if the required
core is cached, if not, it issues a request to FetchCore(c), which will return Core
C2 in this example. With this information, it can check whether its actees have the
authority for T by looking at the local Grant Table.
Notice that FetchCore is preferred over FetchCoreForPrincipal whenever pos-
sible, as it alleviates the extra computation at the AS to find the core that a principal
belongs to.
-- Act-for Link
HasAuthority(P, 7) ? Principal
, Grant
Figure 5-9: Traversal across Different Cores during an Authority Lookup
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Structure of the Client Cache
Aeolus platform instances use the local authority state client to reduce the latency
of authority lookups. When cores are fetched from the AS, they are stored in a core
cache. The core cache is a set of in-memory tables storing a partial authority state
of the system.
Even when the needed cores are in the core cache, however, questions about
whether a principal has authority for a tag can be costly to answer because they
require finding one path among many. For example, a doctor acts-for many patients,
and only one of these paths provides authority for a particular patient-tag. The
local authority state client has a two-tier caching structure. When an authority
lookup is requested, it first checks in a fast content cache and if the request cannot
be answered, it consults a larger and slower core cache.
The content cache allows frequently asked questions, which may involve longer
paths, to be answered quickly. It is likely that if a particular question about author-
ity is answered now, it will be asked again in the near future. The content cache
stores recently computed answers. This cache stores pairs (principal, tag); each en-
try indicates that the principal has authority for the tag. It is implemented as a
hashtable; the hash of the pair serves as the key. The content cache is consulted first
in an authority lookup. In this way, we can take advantage of temporal locality of
lookups within the same application and within user sessions. Upon a miss in the
content cache, the core cache is queried and the answer is added to the content cache.
Cache Management
The content cache and core cache are not unbounded in size and are limited by the
physical memory constraints on compute nodes. When these caches fill up, an eviction
scheme is invoked to select victims. Ideally, victims should be selected such that they
are not likely to be used again. For both the content cache and the core cache, we
use the least-recently-used (LRU) scheme [16] as it is likely that entries used in the
recent past will be used again in the near future.
Both caches use a doubly-linked list to maintain access order of cache entries.
The head of the list refers to the least recently used entry where an eviction victim
is extracted from. When an entry is accessed, it is moved to the end of the list. For
the content cache, an entry is moved to the back of the list when an authority lookup
uses the entry, which provides the desired recently used behavior. However, for the
core cache, the list is updated only in the case of a miss in the content cache and
hence a core that has been used recently via the content cache might be discarded
from the core cache.
5.11.3 Synchronization and Update
Authority updates run at the authority server, while authority lookups are served
locally by an authority state client with occasional communication to the AS to fetch
specific cores.
We store the authority state in a database at the authority server. This is conve-
nient since it allows us to take advantage of database transactions to ensure serializ-
ability and atomicity for performing updates that can affect several tables and many
cores and for handling concurrent client requests. Additionally, the database allows
us to run queries to determine the current system state; since queries are serialized
relative to updates, we can be sure the results are consistent.
An authority update can modify a number of cores while an authority lookup
fetches specific cores. If we are not careful, this can lead to an inconsistent state in
the local caches. For example, suppose authority update U modifies both core Ci
and core C2, and suppose also that an authority state client has a copy of CI in its
cache. If the authority state client makes a fetch request for core C2, its cache might
end up in a state where its CI does not reflect the effects of U, while its C02 does.
It is important to present a consistent view of authority state to applications. For
example, the authority state may contain a portion of a principal hierarchy that has
a conflict-of-interest constraint. Bob can work on behalf of Company A or Company
B but not both. Bob used to work for Company A and this allowed Bob to act-for
CompanyAEmployee, which is recorded in core C1. Later, he leaves to join Company
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B. Company A revokes Bob's ability to act-for CompanyAEmployee and Company B
recognizes Bob as its new employee and allows Bob to act-for CompanyBEmployee,
which is recorded in core C2. The conflict-of-interest constraint will be breached if
an application sees core C1 prior to the updates and core C2 after the updates.
Our platform avoids this problem while still allowing fetches of individual cores.
Our solution is to take periodic snapshots of the authority state and have servers
fetch requests from them. Each snapshot provides a consistent view of the database.
Additionally, we ensure that each authority state client's cache is consistent with the
most recent snapshot. This way, we can avoid having fetches cause inconsistencies.
For the example above: if the snapshot was taken after the update U, then it reflects
changes to both C, and C2; otherwise it reflects neither change. And so long as all
cores in the authority state client's cache are from the same snapshot, they will be
consistent. For example, the authority state client will either see a state before U or
after U.
Clearly, this scheme allows authority decisions to be made based on old informa-
tion. We assume applications can tolerate using a slightly out-of-date version of the
authority state. For example, changes to a hospital's employee list only need to be
propagated daily. However, the system guarantees that this information isn't very
old: snapshots are taken frequently, based on system parameter, A. For example, A
might be set to 30 seconds, which ensures that all authority decisions are based on
information no more than 30 seconds old.
To make this scheme work, we need an efficient way to produce snapshots and an
efficient way to keep server caches up to date with the most recent snapshot.
Producing Snapshots
In our system, the authority server maintains the most recent version of the author-
ity state as shown in Figure 5-10. The authority server serializes authority update
requests from different clients and manages a single write-copy of the authority state.
Examples of authority updates include CreatePrincipal, ActFor, and Delegate. As
discussed earlier, this server uses a database to store the authority state over several
relations. In addition, it maintains an operation log (Op Log) that contains ordered
information about successful authority updates. The operation log allows our system
to keep track of the order of updates with respect to when various snapshots are
taken.
Updates Lookups
Figure 5-10: Authority Server
An update request may change several relations and cores and it is executed
as a database transaction. If the transaction commits successfully, the authority
server assigns the update operation a sequence number and appends an entry to the
operation log. The entry includes the type and input parameters of the authority
update operation as well as the results of applying this operation on the current
authority state (e.g., the newly generated tag ID for CreateTag operation). In this
way, one can parse the operation log as a redo log to construct mirror versions of the
authority state.
The authority server is also responsible for creating snapshots of the authority
state periodically. It does this by making a request to the database to create a low-
overhead copy-on-write snapshot of the authority state. A new database snapshot is
100
--
generated and an unique snapshot name is returned to identify this snapshot. The
authority server adds an entry to the operation log to record this snapshot creation.
Fetches are directed at the most recent snapshot broadcast in update messages,
as shown in Figure 5-11. The authority state client must be informed of the name of
this snapshot so that it can fetch cores from it.
Last Update Next Update BatchInterval ---------------------------
Snapshot Snapshot
Sm Sm+i
Uk Uk+1 Uk+2 Uk+3 Uk+4
... ... L .. . -- timet - Fixed Interval A
Authority Lookups Authority Updates
(Most Recent Snapshot (Current Authority State)
in Update Message)
Figure 5-11: Updates and Snapshots Timeline
Updates
The authority state clients cannot be allowed to lag significantly behind, because this
could permit the use of authority that has been revoked.
Our solution is to have the authority server send out periodic updates: each time
it produces a snapshot, it also sends out an update message that contains the name
of the new snapshot and describes all the changes from the previous snapshot to the
one it just produced. Authority state clients then use this information to bring their
caches up to date, so that they reflect the most recent snapshot.
Authority state clients do not process authority lookups if their state is "too old".
They expect to receive an update message from the authority server every A seconds.
If an update message doesn't arrive quickly enough, the authority state client stops
processing authority lookups until it can communicate with the authority server.
Each update message contains a batch of entries from the operation log. As
mentioned, for each operation, the authority server includes the type of the operation
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(e.g., CreateTag), the input and output values that are important for processing the
update (e.g., the new TID generated), and plus the cores that are affected by this
operation. The last entry of the update batch has the name of the database snapshot
that the authority state client can fetch from after processing these updates locally.
When an authority state client receives an update message, it processes the mes-
sage to reflect these changes locally.
The first thing the authority state client does is to discard all updates that do
not affect any of the cores in its caches. We expect that what remains is a very
small list, usually containing no updates. We expect updates to be rare (so that most
update messages contain very few entries). Clearly the larger the deployment, the
more updates in an update message, but in this case, we expect that many of the
updates are for cores not cached locally at this authority state client.
For updates that affect cores in the core cache, the processing is simple. The core
cache has in-memory tables that are similar in structure to the database relations at
the authority server. For each update, the authority state client checks against the
hashtable to see whether the affected core is cached; if so, it uses the information in
the message to apply updates to the in-memory tables. The procedure is similar to
what was done when the authority update was committed at the authority server. For
example, if the update message specified that a CreateTag operation was committed,
the entry from the update message will include the new TID, the core that it belongs
to, and the principal that created it; the authority state client will add an entry to its
in-memory Tag Table and also add an explicit delegation of this tag to the creator
principal in the Grant Table.
For the content cache, processing of updates is more difficult. The problem is how
to know whether a (P, T) pair in this cache is affected by an update. For example, in
Figure 5-12, Pi has authority for tag T because Pi acts-for P2, P2 for P 3, P 3 for P4 ,
P4 for P5, and it is P5 that has been directly granted authority for T. If the acts-for
from P4 to P5 is revoked, and (PI, T) is in the content cache, it must be removed
since P no longer has authority for T. Note that it is crucial to remove a pair if the
principal is no longer authoritative for the tag. However, it would be safe to remove
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pairs that are still valid, since this cannot cause privilege to be granted erroneously.
HasAuthority(Pi, T7) after RevokeActFor(P 4 to P5)?
Core C, Core C2
S Tz!
L ------------------------------------I --------
Figure 5-12: Problem with Invalidating the Content Cache
One possible solution is to simply clear the content cache. This is clearly correct
but inefficient since the computation needed to place items in the content cache can
be expensive. Our approach is to keep some information about the path used to place
an item in the content cache. An entry (P, T) is placed in the content cache because
a path exists from P to T and this path is determined by traversing the principal
hierarchy in the core cache. Our system records the list of cores of the path that
was found to provide this authority. For the example in Figure 5-12, the traversal
of HasAuthority(Pi, T1 ) uses cores C1 and C2 in the list of dependent cores. This
path information is stored together with the (P, T) entry. With this information, the
authority state client has sufficient information to know which entries to invalidate
when it looks at the update message: if a content cache entry depends on a core C
that has been modified, it is removed.
This approach will sometimes remove cache entries unnecessarily, for two reasons.
First, even though one of the cores an entry depends on has changed, this change
might not affect the entry in the content cache; for example, our approach will remove
(Pi, T) due to an unrelated update such as a revocation of T2 from P6 . Second, the
principal may have authority for the tag via a different path. For example, P, may
act-for a principal in core C3 that has authority for T.
To avoid discarding valid entries from the content cache, we could keep more
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detailed path information, at the level of principals rather than cores. We chose to
use cores because we expect this to reduce the amount of needed metadata; each core
along a path stands for a sub-path involving a number of principals local to that core.
Also, even with detailed path information, we might still discard entries unnecessarily
due to the second problem.
Inter-Node Consistency
In the preceding sections we discussed how compute nodes coordinate with the AS
to assure that there are no inconsistencies. However, there are also issues involving
communication between compute nodes. For example, suppose that node x already
has received the version of the authority state that reflects Bob's move to company A.
If code running at node x makes a call to node y, and y is using an earlier version in
which Bob still works for company A, there can be a breach of the conflict of interest
constraint.
We avoid this problem by including the current authority state version number of
the sender in every message. When a node receives a message, it checks this number
and if it is later than the authority state version being used locally, it communicates
with the AS to bring itself up to date and it delays all requests to check authority
until it is up to date.
Checking Validity of Principals
A problem raised by revocation of an act-for link is how to remove authority from
processes running on the basis of the now-revoked link. For example, suppose Alice
lets Bob act-for her, and Bob uses this authority in a long-lived process that is now
running as Alice. Then Alice revokes the act-for link; the question is how to stop the
long-lived process from proceeding based on authority that no longer exists.
Our solution is to maintain the "basis" of each USER-d's authority. Thus when
Bob exercises the act-for link to start acting as Alice, this information is noted. Ad-
ditionally, whenever a USER-d requests authority, e.g., to declassify, the USER-d
passes the basis to the authority state client, and the authority state client checks the
104
~ri;--~- ci; i- -F -r-;_: l;~-- - --i :; ;-:Li; i-~-~~:~~-;-~ ---; ---- --~- - -i )-- i:; ii: ---- :i;;-  ;::-:li-;i;;i--;:L;;-*~;l~~-:~-i -~-- -i-r-- ; .
validity of every link in the basis; if any of these links has been revoked, it informs
the USER-d that the process's authority is invalid and the USER-d is terminated.
Additionally, the basis is sent in every message, so that we can recognize the revoca-
tion problem even when the revoked link was followed at a different node than where
the process with that authority is now running.
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Chapter 6
Performance Evaluation and
Optimizations
The Aeolus distributed computing platform is designed as a reference monitor that
confines the execution of user applications. By interposing I/O and network requests,
it ensures that information flow properties are preserved. However, this comes at
a performance cost, as it adds overhead in serving these requests. We evaluate the
overhead from various components of our platform, examining local operations as well
as remote ones.
As an application executes, Aeolus platform instances require access to sufficient
authority state to determine whether certain privileged operations should be allowed.
For example, when an application running as principal P issues Declassify (T), does
principal P have authority for tag T? Our authority management architecture is
designed to answer this question in a timely manner while presenting a consistent
view of the authority state. We evaluate its effectiveness.
At the end of this chapter, we also include macro-benchmarks that examine the
end-to-end impact of our platform on application performance.
107
6.1 Experimental Setup
The experiments described in this chapter are performed on a set of identical machines
running the 32-bit edition of Windows XP Service Pack 3 with .NET Framework 2.0.
Each system had 2.5 Ghz Intel Q9300 quad core processors, 4GB of RAM, and a 250
GB Western Digital 1601ABYS SATA/300 disk drives. The systems were connected
via a 100Mbps switch, and the network roundtrip time is less than 1 millisecond. For
most experiments, average values are computed over 1000 runs, at steady state of the
system.
6.2 Local Platform Overhead
Aeolus loads user code into appDomains to restrict their access permissions and isolate
their address spaces. Each platform instance consists of user appDomains that are
used to run a user application, provide the necessary user code isolation, and a proxy
object that interposes various requests in order to enforce the system's information
flow properties. In this section, we look at the overhead introduced by our design
choice and selected implementation techniques. First, we examine the cost of our
isolation mechanism, comparing the cost of using application domains versus OS
processes. Second, we look at the proxy overhead for communicating between user
application domains (USER-d) and the system application domain (SYS-d).
6.2.1 Isolation Mechanism
The application domain is the unit of isolation in the Aeolus platform. Each USER-
d runs with a principal. Computations may run with different principals and user
code can be loaded and executed in different application domains, ensuring complete
separation of program data between code running with different authority. In this
section, we carried out an experiment to evaluate the basic cost of using an application
domain versus an OS process.
This experiment measures the costs of loading an application, starting its exe-
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cution and successfully terminating it, for two cases, one using an OS process and
another using an application domain. Table 6.1 compares the time it takes to execute
a dummy (no-op) application. The values presented are averages over 1000 runs.
Table 6.1: Execution Overhead of OS Processes and AppDomains
Isolation Type Average Execution Time (s)
OS Process 0.117 370
AppDomain 0.012 510
Application domains experience roughly an order of magnitude less overhead in
loading and unloading the code compared to OS processes (0.012s versus 0.117s).
This is expected as application domains are language runtime abstractions where
many application domains can exist in a single OS process. This substantially lowers
the context switching overhead. Hence, application domains experience a much lower
setup, tear-down, and inter-communication overhead.
This experiment provides an estimation of the performance difference one can
expect between the two isolation mechanisms. Next, we evaluate how the use of
appDomains impact the performance of Aeolus.
6.2.2 Inter-AppDomain Communication
Inter-AppDomain communication occurs frequently during the operation of the Aeo-
lus platform. For each privileged call (e.g., access to I/O), the user application code
cannot perform the operation directly since it runs in a restricted appDomain and
must issue an inter-appDomain call from the proxy object to the SYS-d. This requires
marshaling and un-marshaling the call from the restricted user application domain to
the unrestricted SYS-d. In addition, when the call arrives at the unrestricted appli-
cation domain, the .NET security model keeps the permissions of the executing code
at the caller's (restricted) level and therefore, the SYS-d must explicitly raise the se-
curity permissions to handle the call and restore it to the restricted level after the call
finishes. Table 6.2 compares the average roundtrip latencies of such cross-appDomain
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communication with an OS inter-process communication call. An OS IPC is roughly
8 times more expensive.
Table 6.2: Overhead of Cross Boundary Communication
Operation Average Latency (s)
Inter-AppDomain Communication 0.000 025
Inter-Process Communication 0.000 200
6.3 Forks and Calls
6.3.1 Forks
As the application executes, programmers can use the Aeolus API to fork off pieces
of code to run in a different appDomain with the same or a different principal. This
is done by issuing Fork requests. Aeolus sets up a different appDomain for running
the specified code with process labels reflecting the contamination of the caller.
Table 6.3 shows the average request time for executing Fork requests. When
the same principal is used (i.e. Fork), the average request time is 0.458 ms. This
time includes allocating an un-used appDomain from the appDomain pool in SYS-d
and initializing it, running a simple Echo and returning the appDomain to the pool.
Notice that this execution is substantially lower than the cost of using appDomain
in Table 6.1 due to the use of the pool. A common case will be to switch to running
code as Ppublic. The measurements show that this increases the cost slightly requiring
0.461 ms since the process state is updated.
In the case that a different principal is used, Aeolus must check that the requesting
process is running with a principal that is authoritative for the principal that it is
trying to switch to. The SYS-d consults the authority state client for this check,
which requires an OS IPC call and some additional processing. Fork to pid requires
roughly an additional 0.53 ms over Fork to Ppublic as a result of these additional
checks. The measurements are taken against a hot authority client cache and with
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null process labels.
Table 6.3: Fork Overhead
Operation Average Request Time (s)
Fork 0.000 458
Fork to Ppublic 0.000 461
Fork to pid 0.000 997
6.3.2 Calls
Application developers can also use Call to run methods with different principals.
These methods are invoked in the same appDomain as the caller's. Aeolus checks that
the operation is allowed and sets the process' labels appropriately, at the beginning
and at the end of the call.
Table 6.4 compares a normal method call with one that switches to a different
principal. The results show the average request times over 1000 runs of invoking a
simple Echo method. Aeolus does not require special processing for normal method
calls and these methods finish executing in less than 1 ps. For method calls that
require a switch of principal, Aeolus does not require any authority checks when it
is switching to Ppublic and the call suffers negligible overhead in this case. However,
when it switches to other principals, Aeolus contacts the authority state client to
check that the switch is allowed. In this experiment, we measure over hot authority
state caches and so this check requires only local computation at the authority state
client. Unlike a Fork, Aeolus must also update the process' labels at the end of the
call. The average request time for Call to pid is 0.591 ms, roughly equivalent to the
additional time between Fork to Ppublic and Fork to pid for the authority check.
6.4 Authority Closures
Authority closures are used to run code with an anonymous principal. We believe
that they will be used frequently by applications to tightly control how authority for
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Table 6.4: Call Overhead
Operation Average Request Time (s)
Normal Call 0.000 000 3
Call to Ppublic 0.000 000 8
Call to pid 0.000 591 6
certain tags are used.
When an authority closure is called, Aeolus must first determine if the call is legal;
it needs to check that the hash of the specified code is indeed signed by the expected
private key. In the previous chapter, we describe our use of GAC and strong name
to speed up this check. Recall that a closure ID is bound to a private-public key pair
and an anonymous principal. When the closure call is issued, Aeolus must use this
ID to lookup the key and anonymous principal. We have a mapping of this binding
in the SYS-d to reduce communication with the authority state client. Here, we use a
simple micro-benchmark that generates a set of application calls that invoke authority
closures on our platform. Table 6.5 presents the average execution time for running
a simple Echo method inside an authority closure. With all these optimizations, a
closure call takes 0.76 ms, longer than a Fork to Ppublic (as it still requires executing
in a new USER-d) but less than Fork to pid (due to these optimizations).
Table 6.5: Cost of Executing Authority Closure
Operation Average Execution Time (s)
Closure Call 0.000 760
6.5 Remote Procedure Calls
In this section, we evaluate the overhead of a remote procedure call issued within our
platform. Aeolus offers remote procedure call via web service calls.
Our benchmark issues the same type of web service call on both a normal .NET
web service implementation and one that has been wrapped by an Aeolus service call
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proxy and deployed on our platform. The application benchmark is a simple Echo
web service call that causes an input string to be sent to the server and then sent
back to the client. This measures the round-trip latency of a web service invocation.
We took the average of 1000 runs and reported our measurements in Table 6.6.
Table 6.6: Interposition Overhead of Web Service Invocations
Web Service Type Average Latency (s)
Base Web Service 0.002 138
Aeolus Web Service 0.003 600
The Aeolus Web Service version measures the end-to-end time from the remote
call invocation in the user application to the time the result is returned to the appli-
cation. This includes the time for the request to cross the USER-d-SYS-d locally, the
packaging of the information flow state header in the SOAP message, and the dis-
patching and setting up of an appropriate appDomain for running the actual method
in the user web service library on the server. And of course, this also includes the
reverse path for the result to propagate back to the client. We have found that in
optimizing our web service performance, the appDomain pool played an important
role as this significantly cuts down the setup cost in executing the user web service
logic on the server. All the necessary libraries and objects were instantiated and made
ready-to-go in these pre-loaded appDomains. Only the information flow state needs
to be initialized at the time of the call.
In our experiment, the web service client and server are located on different ma-
chines. The network latency is negligible. For each measurement, 1000 web service
invocations are issued consecutively. From Table 6.6, Base Web Service took on
average 2.1 ms to service a request compared to 3.6 ms with Aeolus Web Service.
This is roughly a 1.7X slowdown. Further investigations show that about 1.2 ms of
this time is spent at the server, which shows that the SOAP message interposition
overhead is small.
This benchmark stresses the measured system as the network latency in real de-
ployments are often far greater than several milliseconds making the Aeolus overhead
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much less significant in actual applications. Furthermore, web service latency can be
hidden by the common design practices (e.g., by making these calls non-blocking so
that the application can move on to other tasks before the results are ready). Given
these factors, the observed overhead is unlikely to impact application performance.
6.6 File System
Aeolus FS manages metadata to keep track of the sensitivity of files and directories
and checks incoming file requests against them. It does this by keeping a database
relation that has an entry for each file and directory recording the filepath, filename,
secrecy label and integrity label. In addition, there is a root entry that protects the
entire file system.
Aeolus FS imposes a level of indirection between the user application and the
actual file system implementation. Applications making use of an Aeolus FS will
experience overhead in label checking and in the management of related metadata.
In this section, we investigate this performance overhead, by comparing it to the
native commercial file system running below our platform.
Applications running on Aeolus are likely to execute and store only temporary
data on compute nodes, most of the persistent data will be stored in networked file
systems on storage nodes. Hence, in this experiment, we compare the case where
the client (i.e., benchmark application running on a compute node) and the storage
node are on separate machines. We contrast the implementation of a file system
storage service served by a native file system versus one that we have designed to
store sensitive data. In the latter, there is an Aeolus FS wrapper that manages its
own metadata in a database while storing file content in the native file system. The
former simply provides a remote interface to the native file system. In our experiment,
the native file system is Windows NTFS.
In the first experiment, we use a benchmark that generates a set of directories
and files at various depths and with varying number of files in each directory. The
maximum directory depth is set at 5 and there can be a maximum of 10 files in each
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directory. The number of tags in secrecy label and integrity label vary from 0 to 6.
The benchmark is directed at the two implementations discussed, on the native file
system, Native FS, and on the Aeolus FS file system, Aeolus FS. Table 6.7 shows
the request execution time for different file system administrative operations. The
values in this table represent the average taken over 1000 requests. When files and
directories are created, not only does our system need to check whether the requester
has acceptable secrecy and integrity labels to permit the operation, the Aeolus FS
wrapper also has to update its internal tables to keep track of the labels of the new
files and directories. These contribute to the observed overhead. With the exception
of RemoveDir, most of the overhead is well below 2X. These administrative operations
do not occur too frequently over the lifetime of an application and hence the observed
overhead is quite acceptable. Our implementation of RemoveDir recursively removes
all sub-directories and files requiring removal of all related metadata, the native file
system may have optimizations to perform their recursive removal quickly or lazily.
Table 6.7: Request Servicing Time for File System Administrative Operations
FS Operation (in s) Native FS Aeolus FS Overhead Factor
CreateDir 0.001 230 0.001 573 1.28X
CreateFile 0.001 822 0.002 466 1.35X
ListDir 0.001 211 0.001 418 1.17X
RemoveFile 0.001 636 0.002 721 1.66X
RemoveDir 0.001 300 0.004 194 3.23X
Next, we run experiments to measure the time it takes to read and write files of
varying sizes. Through the Aeolus file system API, there are two ways in which user
applications can read and write files. In the first method, they can do this by reading
and writing the entire file, using ReadFile and WriteFile. In the second method,
they can use file-streams to read and write files in chunks at various points during
an application execution. The file-stream method is preferable especially for large
files where the application can work on one part of the file and later on another part.
Also, it is desirable for appending to a file, for example, when the application is using
a file as a type of status log. We measure the time for reading and writing a file at a
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directory depth of 5 for 1000 runs.
Table 6.8 and Table 6.9 show the results for ReadFile and WriteFile, respectively.
Both the Native FS and Aeolus FS use the same function to store the file content,
namely, .NET's IO.File.ReadAllBytes() and IO.File. WriteAllBytes (). These
methods are synchronous and automatically flush the file content at the end of the
function execution. For very small files, at 10KB file size, Aeolus FS experiences
the greatest overhead as the time taken for label checking operations is relatively
significant compared to the time taken for the file content I/O operations. Even in
this case, the Aeolus FS has only a less than 3% overhead for file reads and writes.
At 10MB, this overhead is almost negligible at 0.02% and 0.09% for reads and writes,
respectively.
Table 6.8: ReadFile Request Time for Files of Different Sizes
Average Request Time (s) Native FS Aeolus FS Overhead Factor
10KB 0.005 5 0.005 6 1.022 2
100KB 0.021 9 0.022 2 1.010 6
1MB 0.188 7 0.188 2 0.997 0
10MB 1.866 1 1.866 5 1.000 2
Table 6.9: WriteFile Request Time for Files of Different Sizes
Average Request Time (s) Native FS Aeolus FS Overhead Factor
10KB 0.004 6 0.004 7 1.026 2
100KB 0.020 8 0.021 0 1.012 2
1MB 0.194 4 0.193 7 0.996 8
O1MB 1.989 8 1.991 7 1.000 9
We also measure file-streams. The last two tests measure the cost of sequentially
reading or writing a file using a file-stream. Most of the overhead is in the label check
that occurs when the file is first used. When data is read or written, we only need to
do the checks if the file-stream is marked as needing to be checked. The experiments
assume that the check isn't needed, since this is the normal case. The check is needed
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only if the process has changed its principal or labels since the last use of the file-
stream making it questionable as to whether the file-stream is still valid. The file is
read or written in 4KB chunks since this is the default size of the underlying system.
Table 6.10 shows that Aeolus introduces very little additional cost over the native file
system for reads and writes. Writes are relatively cheaper in both cases because they
are flushed asynchronously.
Table 6.10: File-stream Open, Read and Write
Average Request Time (s) Native FS Aeolus FS Overhead Factor
Open 0.001 4 0.001 6 1.20
Read
10KB 0.004 7 0.004 9 1.04
100KB 0.040 3 0.040 7 1.01
1024KB 0.415 9 0.416 0 1.00
Write
10KB 0.003 2 0.003 2 1.00
100KB 0.026 7 0.026 7 1.00
1024KB 0.272 4 0.272 7 1.00
6.7 Boxes
Boxes provide encapsulation of sensitive data, preventing unnecessary contamination
prior to the viewing of the box content. Table 6.11 shows the time it takes for basic
operations such as Put and Get on an AeolusBox. In this experiment, the process and
box labels are empty and the box content consists of a simple integer value measuring
the raw overhead of such calls. AeolusBox is implemented as an abstract data type
and hence, no cross-appDomain communication is required and these basic operations
are very fast, taking only 18 us.
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Table 6.11: Cost of Basic Operations on Boxes
Box Operation Average Request Time (s)
Put 0.000 018
Get 0.000 018
6.8 Shared State
While Aeolus FS shows very low overhead over the native file system, sharing of local
data over network filesystem is not very efficient. Aeolus provides shared objects for
local data sharing and shared queues and shared locks for synchronization between
applications running on the same machine.
6.8.1 Shared Objects
In this experiment, we measure the cost of basic operations on a shared object
that contains an integer. The shared state manager is implemented in the SYS-d
and accesses to shared objects require inter-appDomain communication. Table 6.12
shows that accessing this shared object takes 0.05 ms. This includes the label
checks, serialization and de-serialization of the object across the appDomain bound-
ary. ReplaceObject is slightly faster than GetObject since it is a unidirectional
request.
Table 6.12: Cost of Basic Operations on Shared Object
Shared Object Operation Average Request Time (s)
GetObject 0.000 054
ReplaceObject 0.000 051
We also vary the object size and Figure 6-1 shows the average request.times for
different object sizes. We observe a negligible increase in service time for this range
of object sizes.
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Figure 6-1: Shared Object Access Time as Object Size Varied
6.8.2 Shared Queues
A process can also communicate with another process via shared queues. We describe
two experiments in this section. First, we show the costs of basic operations on a
shared queue. Then, we show the results of an experiment that mimics an IPC call
between a client process and a daemon process using shared queue as the underlying
mechanism.
We present the cost of enqueue and dequeue operations on a queue that stores
integer-size messages in Table 6.13. The experiment is setup such that these opera-
tions are served immediately (e.g., WaitAndDequeue is issued on a non-empty queue).
These operations take less than 0.1 ms. WaitAndDequeue takes slightly longer than
Enqueue due to the blocking nature of this call.
Table 6.13: Cost of Basic Operations on Shared Queue
Client Request Average Request Time (s)
Enqueue 0.000 053
WaitAndDequeue 0.000 061
In the second experiment, we have two processes. The daemon process has a
request queue and the client process has a reply queue. The daemon process is
a listener waiting for incoming messages in its request queue. The client starts by
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enqueuing a message into the daemon's request queue, then it issues WaitAndDequeue
to wait on a message from its reply queue. Upon receiving a message in the request
queue, the daemon sends back a reply by enqueuing a response message on the client's
reply queue. Table 6.14 measures the costs of these operations from the client process.
The average Enqueue time is 0.053 ms. The WaitAndDequeue request time includes
issuing the request on the shared state manager, alerting the daemon process with the
incoming message, processing by the daemon to generate and enqueue the response
message on the client's reply queue, and finally alerting the client process. Hence, we
see that the WaitAndDequeue time is longer requiring on average 0.319 ms to get a
reply from the daemon with this setup. The IPC roundtrip time is therefore 0.372
ms.
Table 6.14: IPC using Shared Queue
Average Request Time (s)
Enqueue 0.000 053
WaitAndDequeue 0.000 319
IPC roundtrip 0.000 372
6.8.3 Shared Locks
While shared queue can be used to implement locks, Aeolus provides a more direct
locking mechanism via shared locks. Table 6.15 shows the average request time for
the Lock and the Unlock operation on a shared lock when there is no contention. The
cost of these operations consists primarily of the inter-appDomain calls to shared state
manager in SYS-d and the label checks.
Table 6.15: Basic Operations on Shared Lock
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Shared Lock Operation Average Request Time (s)
Lock 0.000 054
Unlock 0.000 051
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6.9 Authority Management
In this section, we examine the performance of our authority management scheme by
studying its sub-components through a set of micro-benchmarks.
We quantify the costs of various micro-operations on our authority state client
caches. First, we compare the reduction in request latency resulting from the content
cache and core cache. Then, we measure the cost of eviction in both caches. Lastly, we
study the cost of processing authority update messages and the cost of invalidations.
6.9.1 Cache Component Latency
We evaluate our design choice of using a two-tier cache and quantify the benefits of
caching authority state. We compare the average authority lookup latencies of three
configurations: Content Cache only, Core Cache only and Remote AS. Remote AS
refers to the case where all requests go directly to the remote authority server and
the two-tier cache is not used at all. The AS determines the answer by running a
number of queries against the central authority state database and returns an answer
of either yes or no. For the other two cases, authority checks are done locally at
the authority state client. The experiment preloads the caches and hence there is
no communication to the remote AS at all. In the Content Cache only case, all
requests are served by a hot content cache. In the Core Cache only case, the fast
content cache is disabled and all requests are served by a hot core cache.
This experiment consists of generating authority requests that traverse a varying
number of principals and cores. It creates simple linear delegation chains in the
principal hierarchy without any branching. Exactly one principal is created in each
core and delegation chains are created by giving act-for privileges to principals in other
cores. For example, a chain of length 5 involves 5 principals over 5 cores connected
by 4 act-for links and 1 tag delegation link. The principal at the head of the chain
acts-for all principals later on in the chain. The last principal in the chain has explicit
authority for a tag and our experiment measures the request latency in asking about
whether the principal at a certain position on the chain has authority for the tag at
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the end of the chain.
We run 1000 authority requests for each of these configurations. Both caches are
sized large enough such that there are no evictions. There are also no authority update
messages causing updates or invalidations in the measured time interval. Figure 6-2
and Table 6.16 show the results of this experiment.
Latency of Cache Components
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Figure 6-2: Latency of Cache Components
Table 6.16: Speedup using Authority Caches over Remote AS
Delegation Chain Length
1 2 5 8 10
Speedup
Content Cache only 46.76 79.52 143.00 206.90 205.36
Core Cache only 11.55 9.13 6.72 6.05 5.60
The results show that even having just a core cache provides a large speedup over
consulting the AS; note that costs presented here for using the AS are probably lower
than they would be in a real deployment since our AS is close to the node making
the request, and is unloaded. Furthermore the table shows that the content cache
provides another speedup over the core cache. The content cache takes roughly the
same length of time to answer the query regardless of the length of the chain. This
is expected since the authority check is answered by a simple hashtable lookup. For
the AS and the core cache, the time is linear in the length of the chain since their
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request handling time is dependent on the amount of data they are computing (or
traversing) over.
The most interesting column in the table is actually the one for chains of length
1. This represents the best case for both direct use of the AS and for the core cache;
still the content cache does substantially better. Furthermore we expect this case to
be a common one because a good methodology for applications is to run a process
with the principal that has direct authority for the tag, since this is in accordance
with the principle of least privilege.
6.9.2 Eviction
To assess the costs of evictions, we first measure the additional latency that results
from eviction in the content cache by comparing two phases of an execution run.
We generate 20,000 independent authority requests, that is, different principals in
different cores asking about authority for different tags (with a delegation chain length
of 1). We set the core cache size to a very large value while limiting the content cache
size to 10,000 entries. We start the experiment with both caches enabled but empty.
In the first phase, 10,000 of these requests are issued with all of them missing in both
caches and causing new entries to be added. There are no evictions in the first phase.
In the second phase, another 10,000 requests are issued. This time, the content cache
is always at its maximum capacity and every request causes not only both caches
to be filled but also an entry to be selected and evicted from the content cache. As
shown in Table 6.17, the difference in request latency between the two phases gives
the cost of evicting an entry from the content cache, which is about 0.3 ms. This
eviction cost includes updates to LRU data structures and metadata that keep track
of the cores that each content cache entry is dependent on.
Table 6.17: Content Cache Eviction Cost
Phase Average Request Latency (s)
1. Fill-only 0.010 947
2. Evict-and-Fill 0.011 240
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We also run a similar experiment to measure the core cache eviction cost. We
divide the execution into two phases and set the content cache size to a large enough
value such that there are no evictions in content cache. In the second phase, core
cache evictions occur for every request. This causes a core cache entry to be selected
and evicted. Table 6.18 shows the cost of evicting a core from the core cache is
roughly 0.4 ms based on the difference in request latency between the two phases.
This cost includes selecting the core to be evicted using the LRU data structures and
going through all the in-memory tables of the core cache and removing the entries
that belong to this core. The eviction costs for both content and core cache are well
below 1 ms. These costs are primarily due to the data structures used and we intend
to optimize this in the future.
Table 6.18: Core Cache Eviction Cost
Phase Average Request Latency (s)
1. Fill-only 0.010 846
2. Evict-and-Fill 0.011 248
6.9.3 Processing of Update Messages
In this experiment, we want to understand the combined cost of processing authority
update messages, updating the core cache and invalidating the content cache.
Authority update messages are processed as a batch once in each update interval.
We study this invalidation/update processing time as a function of the number of
cores that are invalidated in each batch of messages. This batch processing time
includes the time to parse the messages, perform updates on the core cache, and
invalidate appropriate content cache entries.
We use the above micro-benchmark with a delegation chain length of 1. That
is, each chain has exactly one principal and each principal has been explicitly dele-
gated one tag. Each principal is in a different core. We perform 1000 runs for each
experiment with different number of cores in each message batch. In each run, we
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Figure 6-3: Cost of Processing Authority Updates
first generate a set of authority lookups that affect the desired number of distinct
cores. Then, we issue updates to the AS to remove the delegations that these lookups
depend on, causing the same number of cores to be affected. Stream broadcast is
triggered and the authority state client is informed of these changes. When the au-
thority state client receives these messages, it performs the necessary content cache
invalidations and core cache updates. Figure 6-3 shows this processing time as we
vary the number of cores affected in each experiment. As expected, the processing
time increases almost linearly with the number of cores affected since the number of
entries updated/invalidated increases proportionally.
6.9.4 Miss Penalty
The miss penalty an application experiences depends on a number of factors such as
the length of the delegation chain, the amount of authority state that needs to be
fetched in order to answer the lookup request and how the authority state is organized
by the application or organization. We do not present a comprehensive study in this
section but merely conduct a simple experiment that gives a sense of how request
latency changes with variation in miss rate.
In this experiment, we use the benchmark in Section 6.9.1 and set the delegation
chain length to 10. We use a content cache size and a core cache size of 10,000. The
average latency is measured over 10,000 authority requests. First, we fill these caches
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Figure 6-4: Effect of Miss Rate on Request Time
with entries according to the miss rate we want to measure. For example, to get
a miss rate of 25%, we issue 7500 authority lookup requests (each of these requests
causes one entry in the content cache and one entry in the core cache to be added).
Then, we issue 10,000 additional requests which includes repeats from the ones issued
previously (in the case of 25% miss rate, that translates to 7500 previous requests
and 2500 new requests). Figure 6-4 shows the results of the measurements. Since
all authority requests depend on the same number of principals, tags and cores, the
cost of a miss is constant and as the miss rate increase, the average request latency
increase linearly.' The cost of a miss includes the time to retrieve core from the
remote AS, populate the core cache, compute the result of the authority lookup, and
populate the content cache.
6.9.5 Cache Sizes
The content and core cache sizes change depending on the entries that are stored
even though the maximum number of entries are fixed. For the content cache, the
lookup cache has the following fields in each entry: principal ID, tag ID, and a list
of core IDs that this entry depends on. The pair (principal ID, tag ID) are used
as keys for the cache lookup. The list of core IDs are used for managing evictions
'It is worth pointing out that at a 100% miss rate, the average latency in this figure is higher
than the Remote AS case in Section 6.9.1 since entire cores need to be transferred over the network
before the authority state client computes the result.
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and invalidations. Table 6.19 shows the maximum content and core cache sizes for
the micro-benchmarks generated in this section. The maximum number of entries
in content cache and core cache are both set to 10,000. The maximum cache sizes
are shown for different chain lengths. In these sets of benchmarks, more principals
and more delegations are involved as the number of principals in a chain increases.
Looking at the content cache results, this leads to more cores that each cached entry is
dependent on and therefore, a larger cache size as the chain length increases. For the
core cache, each entry represents all the relevant authority information for one core,
that is, the subprincipals, tags created by these principals, acts-for delegations and
explicit grants given to these principals. For chain lengths of 10, the content cache is
less than 1MB while the core cache is less than 7MB. There are 100,000 principals and
100,000 cores in this case. This gives an estimate of the size of authority information
one may expect.
Table 6.19: Cache Sizes
Number of Principals in Chain
Cache Size (KB) 1 2 5 8 10
Max Content Cache Size 234.38 312.50 546.88 781.25 937.50
Max Core Cache Size 1015.75 1640.75 3515.75 5390.75 6640.75
6.10 End-to-End Evaluations
In this section, we evaluate the overall performance of Aeolus applications. We chose
two applications for our study: online store and secure wiki.
6.10.1 Online Store
This application mimics an online store and is illustrative of a very common appli-
cation pattern involving web services. Many web services are frequently invoked to
perform short client computations and exhibit session-like access pattern. In this
experiment, the online store web service serves many users. Users make calls on the
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server, for example, to update their shopping cart or to finalize their purchase. Each
web service call is invoked on behalf of one user. Each user is represented by a unique
principal. We assume that the authority state of these principals is very compact, so
when principals perform multiple operations as part of a single session, the relevant
parts of the authority state will already be in the content cache.
In this experiment, we explore the performance of web service calls looking at
how the request time varies with the workload. The workload parameter reflects the
temporal locality of principals' use of privilege. We vary the number of new principals
encountered in a measurement run to study different session access patterns. We
measure the latency of a simple web service call that receives a client request, performs
a computation (i.e., compute the total amount in a shopping cart), and then returns
a 4KB result (i.e., HTML page) to the client.
The results are presented in Table 6.20. For a normal web application implement-
ing this web service, the average request latency is 16.67 ms. The Aeolus-enabled
version calls a closure; the closure adds a tag to its secrecy label; does the compu-
tation; declassifies by removing the tag; and then returns the 4KB result. Thus, the
latency includes a remote method invocation, a closure call, a safe label manipula-
tion, and a privileged label manipulation. Each call is made with a different principal.
When all these principals belong to a session, the average request latency is 19.90 ms.
The data show that even if locality is relatively poor, forcing Aeolus to fetch cores
from the AS, the additional overhead imposed by Aeolus is small, requiring 22.31 ms
when all requests run on behalf of new principals.
Table 6.20: Average Request Service Time of Online Store Web Service
% New Principals 0 1  25 50 1  751 100
Normal Web Application (in s) 0.016 67
Aeolus Web Application (in s) 0.019 90 0.020 51 0.021 13 0.021 77 0.022 31
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6.10.2 Secure Wiki
We also took an open-source web application, ScrewTurnWiki [65], and extended it
with security features using Aeolus. We protect against the unintended disclosure
of user passwords by storing them in a labeled file and allowing only an authority
closure invoked during user log-in to access and declassify this information. We also
confined the execution of a third party plugin, the Basic Statistics plugin, to prevent
it from arbitrarily disclosing page access logs. The next chapter discusses the details
of these modifications. In this section, we evaluate the performance overhead as a
result of these modifications. We do this by comparing the latency of the unmodified
ScrewTurnWiki implementation with our modified version.
In the first experiment, we measure the time it takes to process a user log-in
request at the server. The Aeolus version retrieves the labeled file containing the user
password and compares it to the one entered. The comparison is done in an authority
closure. Table 6.21 shows that the original ScrewTurnWiki took 8 ms to serve the
request whereas Aeolus required 12 ms. The additional overhead is primarily the cost
of running the checking code in an authority closure and the overhead of using Aeolus
FS on the server machine rather than using the local filesystem.
Table 6.21: ScrewTurnWiki Login Server Processing Time
Base Aeolus
Average Processing Time (s) 0.008 0.012
In the second experiment, we enable the Basic Statistics plugin and measure the
client request latencies. This plugin is invoked prior to returning a wiki page to the
client. In the Aeolus version, this plugin is executed on top of our platform, runs
with the Ppublic principal, and appends data to a labeled file. Table 6.22 presents
the average request times for the original ScrewTurnWiki and for the Aeolus version.
Using Aeolus resulted in a slowdown of 1.35X in this case.
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Table 6.22: ScrewTurnWiki Page Fetch Latency with Statistics Plugin enabled
Base Aeolus
Average Request Time (s) 0.0101 0.0136
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Chapter 7
Application Case Studies
In this chapter, we study the design and development of information-flow-aware ap-
plications using the Aeolus programming model. We designed two very different ap-
plications to put ourselves in the application developers' perspective, exploring how
one would assign tags to data and organize authority with principals. We also tried
to see where it will be natural to use our programming mechanisms such as authority
closures, boxes and shared state.
The first example is the Retail Kiosk. This illustrates a distributed computation
that involves software providers from different organizations that need to protect their
proprietary data while still being able to provide software services and collaborate
with other vendors. The client logs on to a kiosk at a store and this triggers actions
at five different web servers. The second example is the Clinical Medical Research
System, which shows a very different scenario of how information flow can be used
within a large organization that has a broad range of personnel. Electronic medical
records are used by physicians as well as staff responsible for generating medical bills
and the disclosure of data derived from these records is carefully controlled.
In addition, we also explored the use of Aeolus to improve the security of an ex-
isting application. This application is a wiki server that is accessed by many users
and supports third-party plug-ins. We extended an existing application, ScrewTurn-
Wiki, using Aeolus to provide new security features. We found that we were able to
improve the security of this server by adding only a few lines of code and using a
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simple methodology in which sensitive information was moved to our file system and
controlled through closures.
7.1 Retail Kiosk
This Retail Kiosk case is chosen as an illustration of some of the complex enterprise
processing and highly integrated backend computation that drive today's businesses.
The Retail Kiosk is targeted at the store-of-the-future where kiosks are used to deliver
better customer services. The scenario we use is extracted from studying a real-world
platform being developed at HP [37, 38].
7.1.1 Application Scenario Description
The Retail Kiosk provides various appealing functionalities. In this section, we follow
a particular one: the retrieval of personalized coupons. As a customer approaches this
kiosk at a store, the system displays a set of in-store coupons tailored to this customer.
A single task like generating coupons can involve many software services to determine
what products should be on promotion, to manage customer relationships and pri-
vacy concerns, and to run statistical models to predict what products may appeal to
a specific customer. A lot of sensitive information can be collected and used from
different storage systems and by enterprise services belonging to different organiza-
tions. Third-party software vendors may provide businesses with management suites.
For example, the Promotion Service and the Sales Analyzer Service are aimed
at helping retailers decide what products make strategic sense to be promoted based
on the current inventory status of a retailer and industry-wide trends. These services
can be invoked by different retailers. In order to generate coupons tailored to a par-
ticular customer, the services need to retrieve some information about the customer.
The Customer Management Service maintains and manages collected customer in-
formation according to some privacy policies. A Behavior Modeling Service uses
the customer information and its data models to classify the customer's shopping
behavior. All this information is then used to determine the final set of coupons to
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offer. Figure 7-1 shows the interactions between these services. The arrows indicate
the direction of information flow.
Kiosk
Display
Aeolus Distributed Computing Platform
I-sTo r ~ rhki-de - - -i T- - - -- -n odeI
Product
Kiosk CoupdnsList Promotion
Custom Inventory InfoL------ - fiL - -- - -- -- --
Decision _.Sales Analysis
' -- ~~ T-- T-- .... ,.
Analyzer Company A's
sgs Sales Figures
CM Node BM Node SA Node
Modeling DatasetCustomer Data
Figure 7-1: Retail Kiosk Scenario
This application scenario demonstrates an application solution that results from
the interactions of five organizations providing software services on different servers.
The Kiosk runs as a local application on a display kiosk while the Retail Kiosk
Service runs on an in-store backend server. Consulting firms offer the Promotion
Service and the Sales Analyzer as subscriber-based software exposed as web ser-
vices. The Behavior Modeling Service and Customer Management Service are
provided by different software vendors.
7.1.2 Data Security Concerns and IFC Program Structure
The Kiosk application manages a user session at the retail store. A user logs on and
authenticates to the system. The Kiosk application ensures any data displayed to the
customer must belong to the customer or be properly declassified. For example, data
with a retailer's sales performance sensitivity cannot be disclosed. This is achieved
by running the Kiosk application with the principal ID associated with the customer
(e.g., PAice). In this way, it has the authority to declassify and endorse only tags
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Industry Statistics
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that are created by this principal. The Kiosk sits at the boundary of our system
and works together with an authentication mechanism to provide a secure channel
for displayed data (outside of our system).
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Figure 7-2: Retail Kiosk implemented using Aeolus
The Kiosk application is driven by backend logic such as the Retail Kiosk
Service. It calls the Retail Kiosk Service to do the actual retrieval of coupons.
The Retail Kiosk Service also belongs to the store and runs as part of the retailer's
backend system. A customer can invoke these backend services but the store defi-
nitely does not want a customer to have the authority for the tags used to protect the
store's inventory data. When a GetCoupons 0() call is made on the backend service,
it is called as an authority closure to decouple the authority. A new computation is
created to run this code under the anonymous principal PStoreA-
The Retail Kiosk Service makes several calls to remote services that assist in
coming up with the final list of coupons. First, the Retail Kiosk Service invokes
a Promotion Service to analyze the store's inventory status and to figure out what
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Promotion Service:
GetPromoProducts(in store)
P=Ppublic
S={StoreAnfo}, 1= /
1. AddSecrecy(StoreAlnfo)
2. s = GetOverStock(StoreA)
3. t = CC(GetSalesTrend0)
4. 1= DetermineProdList(s, t)
5. RETURN I
Sales Analyzer Service:
GetSalesTrend(
P=Psanalyer
S={StoreAlnfo, StoreASales,
StoreBSales, IndustryStats). I1=0
1. AddSecrecy(StoreASales,
StoreBSales, lndustryStats) 0
2. Read sales and industry info
3. t = CormputeTrend(s)
4. Declassify(StoreASales,
StoreBSales, IndustryStats)
5. RETURN t
)
products should be advertised. The Promotion Service does not need any authority
and hence, it is run with the principal Ppublic. Prior to accessing the inventory for
StoreA, it needs to add the StoreAInfo tag to its secrecy label to permit the read.
This service is further decomposed into other services. A Sales Analyzer Service
is designed to come up with popular product categories based on different companies'
sales figures. Therefore, how it uses and discloses this information must be carefully
controlled. Sales data and industry trends are marked with tags in their secrecy labels.
For example, Store A uses the tag StoreASales to protect its sales figures. The Sales
Analyzer Service must be executed as an authority closure. Only the anonymous
principal Panalyzer has sufficient authority to declassify individual companies' sales
data and this principal can only be used with the code GetSalesTrend(). Different
stores trust this authority closure to declassify their sales figures. When a company
enrolls with the Sales Analyzer Service, it grants this closure authority for its
tag. Based on the sales trend and the inventory status, the Promotion Service
returns the promotional product list to the Retail Kiosk Service. The Retail
Kiosk Service becomes tagged with an additional StoreAInfo tag as a result of
this.
Next, the Retail Kiosk Service invokes a Customer Management Service to
retrieve the customer's profile and in the process, gets marked with the customer's tag
(i.e., AliceInfo in its secrecy label). Using the customer's profile and the product
list, the Retail Kiosk Service consults the Behavior Modeling Service about
which products on the list should be offered based on this customer's profile. The
Behavior Modeling Service is administered by a different organization and uses
a proprietary modeling dataset to make these decisions. This dataset is protected
by the tag Model created by this organization. The Behavior Modeling Service is
presented as an authority closure so that this organization can have full control on
how any dependent result is declassified. The authority for the Model tag is bound
to an anonymous principal Pmodeler which is associated with the Decide () code. This
code classifies the customer based on his/her profile and selects products from an
input list that will be appealing to the customer using its proprietary algorithms.
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Now, the Retail Kiosk Service has a list of coupons tailored for the logged
on user. Its process has the two tags StoreA (from the Promotion Service) and
AliceInfo (from the Customer Management Service) in its secrecy label. Prior to
returning this list to the Kiosk application, it removes the StoreA tag. The Kiosk
application can then remove the customer's tag and display the coupons to the user
standing at the kiosk.
7.1.3 Programming Experience
Using the Aeolus programming model, it was easy to think about the authority needed
for different code segments. The explicit safe label manipulations helped identify
code that consumes sensitive data and from there on, we can consider the different
outputs that are derived from it and under what circumstances might declassification
be acceptable. For example, the product list generated by the Promotion Service
is tagged with the StoreA tag after it has learned about the inventory status of the
store. We do not want to declassify this data immediately and by keeping it tagged,
we prevented the Behavior Modeling Service from leaking it. Instead, when the
Retail Kiosk Service has narrowed this down to a much shorter list of coupons
that will be generated, we declassify the StoreA tag.
We also found that authority closures were very useful especially in this case where
many different organizations are involved. They do not trust each other enough to
use delegations. Notice that the principal hierarchy is very bushy, with principals
(and anonymous principals) being directly authoritative for tags. Authority closures
are preferred in this scenario since they allow these organizations to better limit
how authority can be used. We saw that this was useful in two very different cases.
The Behavior Modeling Service uses an authority closure to run its own code and
protects most of the execution with the Model tag it has authority for. In this way,
it controls precisely how its sensitive data are used by an invoker from a different
organization. On the other hand, the Sales Analyzer Service is a piece of third-
party code that multiple companies entrust their sales data to. Each company can
examine the code and verify that no other company can learn too much about its
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company's sales data by running this authority closure. Another difference is that
the authority of the first closure is fixed while that of the second changes as new
companies enroll in the service.
The Ppublic principal turns out to be quite useful. At first, we were going to assign
different principals to each code segment but later realized that many sections can
run without any authority and they are better run in a fail-safe manner with the
Ppublic principal. For example, if the Customer Management Service had retrieved
the profile for Bob rather than Alice, this programming error will be caught as the
final coupon will not be able to display on the kiosk.
Although there are no file updates in this application scenario, performing updates
can be tricky as the developers have to be careful in considering the order for retrieving
sensitive data and calling different functions. For example, if the Sales Analyzer
Service needs to update a log at the end of its computation (e.g., to know how to
charge companies for usage of its service), it is prevented from doing so since it is
called after the process became tagged with the StoreAInfo tag that this service is
unable to declassify.
7.2 Clinical Medical Research System
Clinical information systems must comply with legal policies in protecting sensitive
patient health data. Electronic Health Records (EHRs) are accessible by various
physicians, medical specialists and hospital staff at primary care facilities. Standards
such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [8] are put
in place to address the security and privacy of health data. This application scenario
examines some of the design considerations for software that may run on physicians'
desktops and by medical researchers and hospital staff. Parts of this scenario have
been presented in earlier chapters to demonstrate Aeolus programming constructs.
Here, we elaborate with some additional examples.
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7.2.1 Application Scenario Description
This scenario captures a set of applications that is commonly found in clinical settings.
We focus on four programs: Patient Registry, Physician's Desktop, Insurance
Billing Generator, and Trend Analyzer. Front-desk staff uses the Patient Registry
to add new patients or update their mailing and billing addresses. The Physician's
Desktop is intended to assist doctors during patient visits to record measurements and
notes on observed symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis. This desktop software is avail-
able at various physicians offices and terminals in the hospital. A physician is required
to log-in to the system with his/her username and password. Patient data are stored
in a central data repository in this system. The Insurance Billing Generator is
a background process that goes through information on patients' visits to determine
the charges for the consultations and medical procedures preformed. This program
translates this information into standardized medical billing codes and submits them
to the patient's insurance company. The Trend Analyzer can be used by researchers
to study disease progression and correlations that can improve decision-making for
diagnosis and treatment of diseases.
7.2.2 Data Security Concerns and IFC Program Structure
Patient data are collected, handled and stored by the healthcare facility. These health-
care providers are required to protect such sensitive data. The HIPAA Privacy Rule
categorizes many of the above (demographic information, medical record, payment
history) as Protected Health Information. It regulates their use and requires providers
to make a reasonable effort to disclose only the minimum necessary information re-
quired to achieve various clinical operations.
While physicians should have the right to read and update patient's medical record
for patients that they are responsible for, the physician should not be able to view
demographic information (e.g., his/her patient's home address). On the other hand,
front-desk workers needs to update this information but they should not be able to
disclose patient's medical history. Billing information contains a summary of proce-
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dures done at hospitals and clinics that is generated from the examination of physi-
cians' and nurses' notes. While the payment data are less sensitive than the original
medical history, this information should still be protected from staff outside of the
finance department. The aggregation of numerous patient records can reveal patterns
advancing the field of medicine. However, these research studies should only involve
patients that have given informed consent.
Data Categorization
To limit the amount of sensitive data used by different applications, we use different
tags to tag patient data. Demographic data should be handled with great care as
they contain personally identifying information. The hospital administration uses a
tag TDemographic to tag the file that stores such information for patients and staff. Logs
on generated payment requests are kept on persistent storage using the tag TPayment
to protect data secrecy. Research findings are important intellectual property and
are kept in data repositories marked with TProprietary sensitivity. For each patient,
there are two tags: TPatientSign and TPatientMedical. The first can be used to label the
integrity of signed consent forms while the second is used to tag the patient's medical
record.
Management of Principals
Each registered patient has a principal ID (e.g., Alice) as shown in Figure 7-3.
Each hospital staff also has a principal ID. For example, there is a principal ID for
physician Carol, one for front-desk worker Dave, one for billing staff Eve, and one for
researcher Fred. There is an overall hospital administration principal Clinic-Admin.
As staff join and leave the hospital, the administrator assigns them different roles by
using act-for delegations. For example, Dave is set to act-for FrontDesk Worker and
Fred is set to act-for Researcher. By acting for these principals, Dave and Fred are
able to obtain the authority needed to get their job done. Through the FrontDesk
Worker, Dave can retrieve patient's demographic data to schedule appointments.
The Researcher principal gives Fred the ability to study the hospital's proprietary
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research data.
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Figure 7-3: Principal Hierarchy in Clinical Application Scenario
The hospital administrator creates the tags TDemographic TPayment and TProprietary*
It delegates the TDemographic tag to the FrontDesk Worker role since it needs to handle
such information while the Researcher role is delegated the TProprietary tag.
When a new patient enters a hospital, a new principal ID is generated for the
patient along with the two patient-specific tags mentioned above. The TPatientMedical
tag is created as a sub-tag of the top-level Tall-patient tag. Hence, the authority for
the patient's TPatientMedical tag is given to the Billing Closure which has authority
for the Tall-patients tag. The patient is asked whether he/she wants to participate in
research studies and consent forms are signed and kept on file. If the patient agrees
to be part of the study, the authority for the TPatientMedical sub-tag is given to the
Scrub Closure. The signed consent form is stored securely and protected with the
tag TPatientSign in its integrity label. Furthermore, the patient specifies the physicians
and specialists that he/she has been referred to allowing them to act on behalf of
him/her in handling medical data. In this example, Carol is Alice's doctor and Carol
is made to act-for AliceDoctor.
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Patient Registry
When a patient enters the hospital, Dave, the FrontDesk Worker, looks up the pa-
tient's address information and checks that it is still up-to-date. If the patient has
moved, he enters the new information into the system. If the patient is new to the
clinic, a new entry is added to the patient registry. This registry is protected by the
TDemographic tag in both its secrecy and integrity labels. Dave is able to update the
registry since he runs his desktop software with the FrontDesk Worker role and this
role is authoritative for the TDemographic tag which proves that it has the required
authority to write to the registry.
Insurance Billing Generator
Billing is a background process that Eve the internal auditor runs every reporting
period to generate payment information. Eve uses the payment information generated
by Billing Closure. The Billing Closure contains code that leaves out patient
medical details and translates visit information into procedure billing codes. In this
way, the Billing Closure is trusted with declassifying patient records and is given
authority for the Tall-patient compound tag. This compound tag covers both the
TAliceMedical and TBobMedical sub-tags. To ensure that the disclosure of this payment
information is controlled, this code attaches the tag Tpayment to the resulting data
before writing it to a log. Hence, Eve must run her generator software with the
Auditor principal authoritative for the TPayment tag.
Trend Analyzer
The Scrub Closure is able to read in selected patients' data and de-sensitize them
by anonymizing patient data and obfuscating fields that are not needed for research
purposes. Researcher Fred uses this closure to examine scrubbed patient records
for ones that have proper patient consent. In this example, Alice has given consent
while Bob has not and so this authority closure has been delegated TAliceMedical and
not TBobMedical. Researcher Fred can study and analyze this data for example in
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determining the correlation between patients with high blood pressure and heart
disease. Fred uses the TProprietary tag to protect his research findings.
Physician's Desktop
Carol is a physician responsible for many patients. Carol has to keep records of
different patients separate and avoid mistakenly updating the wrong medical records.
When Alice the patient walks into Carol's office, Carol switches the Physician's
Desktop software to run with the AliceDoctor prinicipal. This allows Carol to
review Alice's symptoms from previous visits and enter new consultation report into
the system. During this time, these computations and updates are executed within a
process that has the TAliceMedical tag in both its secrecy and integrity labels, ensuring
that it is reading Alice's data and updating only her record.
7.2.3 Programming Experience
The usage of the principal hierarchy in this Clinic example is quite different from the
Retail Kiosk example. The Clinic example is a closed organization and the principal
hierarchy is dominated by a clinic-admin principal. The hierarchy is used to define
roles that different users are assigned to in this environment. As patients, doctors and
hospital staff logs on to run different software, they act-for these roles and inherit the
needed authority to get their work done. By defining roles, the principal hierarchy can
be used as a way to manage patients and employees joining and leaving the system;
it also nicely handles changing patient-doctor relationships.
The use of tags was important in representing different types of data that can
belong to a single user such as a patient. Tags provide fine-grained control where
authority can be limited to a very specific piece of data (e.g., TDemographic for demo-
graphic data and not patient records or payment information). Furthermore, com-
pound tags provide a very convenient short-hand to grant authority for all patients'
tags to the Billing Closure.
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7.3 Secure Wiki
For our final study, we took an existing web application, ScrewTurnWiki [65], and
extended it with information flow security. ScrewTurnWiki is a relatively small single
server application. Here, we examine the Aeolus design from the viewpoint of mod-
ifying the wiki's code base to use our mechanisms in protecting sensitive user and
system data.
7.3.1 Application Scenario Description
ScrewTurnWiki 2.0 is a popular open-source .NET wiki engine that provides features
common to most wikis such as page creation and editing, simple user management,
and support for third-party plug-ins. ScrewTurnWiki can be used to host private
blogs as well as collaboration web sites with many users. Users create wiki pages that
are either publicly visible or visible only to user account holders.
ScrewTurnWiki has a modular storage interface that can interact with file sys-
tems, databases and custom storage solutions. Moreover, it has well-defined APIs
that allow third-party developers to insert their code at various stages during the
processing of a page request. For example, there is a plug-in that provides support
for different languages and another that tracks visits to different wiki pages. How-
ever, ScrewTurnWiki provides little support for security. This is especially of concern
because of insertion of third-party code, since this means there is an expanding code
base that might leak sensitive information.
7.3.2 Data Security Concerns and IFC Program Structure
We show two examples of how Aeolus can be used to strengthen data security in
ScrewTurnWiki. The first example deals with sensitive user profile data such as pass-
words and e-mail addresses. The second example shows how to handle untrusted
plug-ins such as the Basic Statistics Plugin 1.3.3 module downloadable from Screw-
TurnWiki's website.
Like many web applications, ScrewTurnWiki is deployed as a server application
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where all modules within the application have the same authority. For example, the
login code as well as the page formatter code can access files containing user pass-
words. Any method can wipe out or corrupt server data kept on logs and application
caches. In the first example, we isolate sensitive user profile information and make
use of Aeolus FS to store them persistently. The file containing sensitive user profile
data is protected by the tag Tadmin in its secrecy label and we allow only certain code
such as the login module to use such data. The login module runs within an authority
closure and the anonymous principal of this closure is given authority for Tadmin-
When a new user account is created, the non-sensitive part of the profile data is
stored as-is and only a small set of sensitive data (password and e-mail) is redirected
to the Aeolus FS. Most of the user registration code is unmodified. When a user
logs in to the wiki, an authority closure takes in the username and password and
returns a boolean value on the result of the password check. This closure fetches
the sensitive profile data from the Aeolus FS and declassifies the Tadmin tag before
the boolean value is returned. The checking code that runs in the authority closure
consists of less than 10 lines of code. A programming error in these few lines can
inadvertently disclose the password, however, a bug in the remaining 18K lines of the
ScrewTurnWiki code cannot.
The second example concerns the use of the Basic Statistics plugin. Plug-in mod-
ules like these are written by open-source and commercial developers with varying
levels of programming skills. They are valuable in enriching the core wiki engine but
care must be taken that they do not reduce the overall security of the application.
The Basic Statistics plugin is triggered whenever the server application is about to
return a wiki page to the user. It tracks all visits to wiki pages and maintains a log of
such information. For each page access, it records the IP address, user browser/OS,
URL, language, username (if any) and access time. From the log, various statistics
such as access pattern and frequency can be derived. In most cases, the complete
log is used only for administrative and auditing purposes. But nothing prevents its
release and there are clear privacy issues if this should happen. Furthermore, an error
in this logging code can place copies of wiki pages in the log and disclose them to
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users that are not intended to see them. We use the Aeolus FS to maintain the log
in a file with the tag Tstats in its secrecy label. Most of the plug-in code runs with
the Ppublic principal and only small sections of code where summarized information
such as total number of accesses on a page is revealed run with more authority via
an authority closure.
7.3.3 Programming Experience
We were surprised to find that with these small modifications, we were already able
to strengthen ScrewTurnWiki against potential security vulnerabilities in different
parts of its code base. The approach we found useful in this exercise was to isolate
sensitive data, identify small code sections that require authority to disclose sensitive
data, and execute all remaining code with no authority (using Ppublic)-
In terms of the amount of retrofitting needed, this depended on the data structures
used in the existing code. For the password protection, we simply left the data
structures as-is but scrubbed out the sensitive portions. We introduced new data
structures for storing the sensitive portions of a user profile and redirected code
that accessed them. These changes were needed only in a handful of places and by
scrubbing, we ensure that if we missed a reference (probably this would be an error
in the wiki code), no security leak is possible.
The reason it was necessary to scrub the data is because a large portion of the
code in the application was implemented in ASP.NET pages or web forms that are
invoked by Microsoft IIS which did not run on top of Aeolus. Therefore, we could not
control how information flowed in that code. By scrubbing the sensitive data, we were
able to ensure that if any code in the application accessed the data structures where
it used to be stored, still no leaks could occur. Figure 7-4 shows how we modified
ScrewTurnWiki to redirect the execution to code that runs on Aeolus.
ScrewTurnWiki has the potential to support many plug-ins. We found that
application-level tags and the ability to delegate and revoke authority to be im-
portant. New plug-ins may require a different collection of authority and obsolete
plug-ins should have their authority revoked. The authority state provides a central
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Figure 7-4: Modifications to ScrewTurnWiki
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Chapter 8
Related Work
Information flow control is not a new concept and it was first studied in the 1960s.
Lampson's paper on the confinement problem [36] pointed out the insufficiency of
using only access control to protect sensitive data. Information leakage can happen
when a subject authorized to access an object discloses it to another subject not au-
thorized to access it. Information flow control is a set of techniques that alleviates this
problem by enforcing how data is disseminated and propagated. The Bell-LaPadula
model [1] and the Biba model [2] are some of the earliest formal models that addressed
the confidentiality and integrity issues in information flow. These models were de-
signed to protect classified and secret information for government and military use
and focused on a specific form known as Multi-Level Security (MLS) [58].
Operating systems dating back to the 1960s have provided some information flow
isolation based on these models. At the operating system level, end-to-end informa-
tion flow control can be tracked and enforced since the OS has access to all resources.
ADEPT-50 [64] applied the high-watermark model to keep track of the highest secu-
rity level of objects that have been opened. IX [40] and LOMAC [23] impose similar
kinds of security models in the kernel based on a lattice of sensitivity labels. These
systems require a centralized unit to assign users to different classification or privilege
levels.
In the 1990s, Myers and Liskov [45] introduced the concept of decentralized in-
formation flow control. This approach makes it possible to use discretionary controls
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with policy decisions delegated to individual users and does not rely on one adminis-
trator configuring all policies correctly.
Aeolus and more recent systems support decentralized information flow control
where different data categories can be owned by modules. Though many systems have
provided some information monitoring (via processor micro-architectures [59, 53, 13],
emulators [46, 4, 11], virtualization techniques [12, 67, 24, 56], security extensions [54,
22, 47], and web-browser support [62, 63, 9, 66, 5, 39]), we focus our discussion on
the two lines of research that are most closely related to Aeolus: the programming
language work and the operating system work.
8.1 Programming Languages
Myers and Liskov introduced decentralized information flow in JFlow [45, 43], a Java-
based programming language. JFlow and its successor Jif [44] allow program to define
a security policy for data, by annotating program constructs with data security labels,
and uses the compiler to track and enforce information flow within a single program.
They rely on a type system and static analysis, which have the advantage that they
can conservatively identify information flow, providing stronger security assurances
(e.g., non-interference property). Their labels are expressed in terms of principals
(owners) and the security policies an owner wishes to impose on other principals. For
example, each variable has a label and one can only write (i.e. declassify) it to the
printer if the code is running with a principal that is allowed by all owners.
The initial language work did not provide mechanisms for interacting with OS
resources such as files and sockets. Static analysis relies on closed-world assumptions
with guarantees being made on a single program, and dynamic extensions can easily
invalidate these guarantees [26]. The approach assumed a centralized principal hierar-
chy where programs can perform dynamic checks on act-for relationships. However,
the work did not address updates to the principal hierarchy. A class method can
be associated with a principal and in this way, they provide similar guarantees as
our authority closures. These languages were intended to support a single sequential
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program and had no support for concurrency and for running a long-lived dynamic
system.
There has been a large body of follow-on work ([30, 28, 31, 55, 7, 72, 57, 29, 6]).
Here, we review the work that attempts to bridge the gap between this static way
of handling information flow and real-world applications and operating environments
since this is most relevant to Aeolus.
Jif guarantees non-interference within a single application but does not provide
support for files and sockets, which are needed in real-world applications. SIESTA
(Service for Inspecting and Executing Security-Typed Applications) [30] is an operat-
ing system service that combines Jif and SELinux [47] to allow labeling to extend from
files and sockets to applications. It allows the operating system to use its mandatory
access control (MAC) module to pass labeled data into an application (via an API
for Jif) and it ensures that the application complies with the OS MAC policy (via
compliance analysis). It does this by using SELinux to provide the MAC functionality.
Hicks et al [28] showed via the development of the JPmail e-mail application
how Jif can be extended for designing real-world applications. They showed how to
build a "principal store" that uses public-key infrastructure to provide uniqueness
and persistence.
When the principal hierarchy changes, this can violate information flow assump-
tions of running programs. In particular, revocations can invalidate the authority of
a process if it has used authority derived from its actee. Hicks et al [31] permitted
dynamic updates to the principal hierarchy by placing restrictions on updates, dis-
allowing ones that will violate properties of already executing programs. Swamy et
al [55] introduced transactional semantics on principal hierarchy updates and allowed
them to be made by contaminated programs by adding labels to the PH.
SIF [7] is a framework for building web applications using Jif. It addresses the
limitations of security typed languages for reasoning about security in a dynamic
external environment. In particular, it addresses authentication and session-based
behavior of web applications through authorization closures and session principals.
Authorization closures are used to obtain the authority of application users after they
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have authenticated themselves (e.g., with a password). They provide a translation
of "user principals" to Jif's principals. A session principal is then assigned to act
on behalf of the now logged-in user. This work shows how a Jif web application can
interact with an untrusted client browser to provide end-to-end guarantees.
There has also been a lot of work in extending the type system to provide provable
guarantees for dynamic mechanisms such as dynamic security labels [72] and dynamic
principals [57] to support labels and principals that are not known at compile time
while still preserving the non-interference property. Dynamic security labels allow
the type-system to potentially support dynamic checks at the reading and writing of
files and database records. Dynamic principals integrate static checks with external
notions of principals (e.g., users authenticated through a public key infrastructure).
An extension to Jif has been proposed in [29] to support declassifier functions using
a relaxed model called non-interference modulo trusted methods. Robust declassifica-
tion, defined in [6], ensures that an entity that can influence the behavior of a system
(for example, by providing or modifying data or code) is unable to observe more in-
formation than an entity that cannot influence system behavior. The key observation
for enforcing robustness is to ensure that if a declassification reveals information to
attacker A, then A is unable to influence either the decision to declassify or the data
to be declassified. Jif was extended with a simple dependency check at Declassify
to provide this property.
8.2 Operating Systems
The operating systems work ([18, 60, 69, 71, 68, 35, 34, 50]) differs from the program-
ming language work in a number of important ways.
First, rather than expressing policies using principals, these systems use tags.
Tags identify compartments and provide a way of grouping related items, i.e., ones
that are all managed using the same security policy.
Second, they use dynamic rather than static checking. As a process runs the
system checks its information flow status. Dynamic checking is completely accurate:
150
a process's labels exactly reflect what it did. This differs from the static approach,
which must sometimes err in a safe direction, so that the labels are more restrictive
than necessary. Additionally, with static checking, a fine-grained analysis is possible
so that different variables can have different labels. This isn't possible with a dynamic
approach although our boxes provide support for doing this in a limited way.
Third, the operating system work is based on capabilities, which are passed among
processes and can be stored for later use. They have capabilities for tags and in this
way, they are able to avoid having principals in the model, although they do have
to allow for a way for users to log on and obtain the capabilities they used in the
past. By contrast, the programming language work and Aeolus assume the existence
of authority state, which is consulted to determine whether security sensitive actions
can be allowed.
A final point is that the operating systems work uses labels both for access control
and information flow control. Aeolus and most of the programming language work
keep them separate.
Asbestos
Asbestos [18, 60] is the first operating system with decentralized information flow
control. All the operating systems work has followed this model.
Asbestos attaches labels to operating system processes and provides a UNIX-based
operating system. Labels are used both to reflect a process' contamination and to
express the process' authority as a set of capabilities. Their labels are expressed in
terms of tags and levels, without any use of principals. Asbestos provides a way to
grant capabilities to another process. Revocation is difficult in a capability-based
system and is not addressed in Asbestos.
Asbestos uses standard capability-based mechanisms to provide system-wide per-
sistence of authority. A pickle is a special file that stores privilege for a single tag. A
process can create a pickle file that can later be un-pickled to retrieve the authority.
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HiStar
HiStar [69, 68] provides information flow at the level of an operating system kernel;
this way it is able to have a much smaller secure base than Asbestos. The kernel is
intended to be used to build an operating system and the utility of the kernel was
demonstrated by implementing an untrusted user-level UNIX emulation layer. HiStar
is not intended to support user code directly.
HiStar labels are similar to those of Asbestos. The work improved on Asbestos
(as described in the original paper [18]) by requiring threads to explicitly request safe
label changes; this is important because it avoids covert channels possible in Asbestos
via IPC.
HiStar uses capabilities and has a single-level store to maintain system-wide per-
sistence. This single-level store is used to maintain capabilities given to threads and
gates as well as to implement a user-level file system out of containers and segments.
Operations are performed on memory-mapped files in the thread's address space.
HiStar supports IPCs via gates. Gates provide a protected control transfer and
make resource allocations explicit to avoid covert channels when invoking methods.
They bind privileges with a well-defined entry point for the callee' process to execute
the method (e.g., this gate is for running callee.Foo () with authority for TAlice). In
this way, gates are similar to authority closures, however, they are too low-level for
writing user applications. HiStar maintains labels for threads and threads can access
shared address spaces. Address spaces are page-aligned and hence, HiStar provides
for page-level data sharing.
DStar
DStar [71] extends HiStar over the network, carefully controls the covert channels
that may exist in resource allocation, and delegates trust using delegation certificates.
One of DStar's design goals is decentralized trust: there is no trusted authority like
Verisign to provide reliable naming of machines; instead each machine is identified by
a public-private key pair. Category names are self-certifying and identify the machine
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that the category belongs to. DStar maintains the private-public key information in
local exporters and uses address certificates to distribute this (IP address, key) bind-
ing. Delegation certificates are signed by the owner machine to delegate a category
to a receiving node. DStar relies on renewable leases for revocation.
Flume
Flume [35] is a reworking of Asbestos, with several important differences. First,
Flume is implemented by a user-level reference monitor rather than a DIFC operating
system. This approach avoids the need to modify the operating system; additionally,
it means that Flume is unaffected by new release of operating system code. However,
compared to Asbestos, Flume has a larger trusted base (the reference monitor plus
the operating system).
A second difference is that Flume provides much simpler labels than Asbestos and
HiStar because it breaks the single label of these systems into their three components
(a secrecy label, an integrity label, and an ownership label that keeps track of read
and write capabilities).
Flume keeps track of capabilities using a central tag registry that maps login tokens
to capabilities. Flume's setlabel binds a login token (and hence capabilities) with a
program. In this way, setlabels are similar to authority closures; however, they are
implemented as special files that hide the login tokens with secrecy and integrity
labels that limit who can invoke it, whereas authority closures can be invoked by
anyone since their security is guaranteed by analyzing the code.
A final point is that Flume provides endpoints as a way to reduce the cost of
label checking as messages are received or files are used. These endpoints were an
inspiration for the way we implement file-streams in Aeolus.
Laminar
Laminar [50] is based on Flume. Like Flume, it is implemented on top of the OS, but
because Laminar includes some programming language as well as kernel extensions,
its trusted base includes in addition to the operating system, a modified Java virtual
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machine. Laminar introduces support for processes to shared objects, an ability that
is missing in all of the OS work except for HiStar, where sharing happened at the level
of pages. Sharing happens through a linguistic mechanism called a security region;
programs using Laminar must use the extended language that supports regions. A
security region is a lexical scope within a process that can have its own labels. Laminar
attaches Flume labels to each region and checks when data access crosses two regions.
However, these checks can be costly.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions
9.1 Methodology
This thesis has presented Aeolus, a new distributed platform intended to support the
development and deployment of applications that can be trusted to avoid accidental
release of information. Aeolus supports applications through a new, simple security
model based on information flow control. In addition, Aeolus provides a number
of new features: anonymous authority closures, compound tags, boxes, and shared
volatile state. These mechanisms provide needed expressive power to application de-
velopers and make it easier to develop safe applications.
Aeolus advocates a principled approach to secure software design.
* Understandable and Easy to Use. The programming model introduces
a set of programming constructs. These constructs are intuitive and easy to
understand.
* Sufficiently Expressive. The programming model is sufficiently expressive
that a developer can specify common data flow patterns.
* Debuggable and Auditable. The programming model allows developers to
reason about their IFC constraints and can provide interfaces for extending au-
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diting and debugging features. The use of principals and a logically centralized
AS make it possible to build audit trails.
* Implementable. The programming model is enforceable and we have shown
an implementation of the model that does not have significant performance and
scalability penalties.
9.2 Infrastructure
A prototype implementation based on C# and .NET showed that an Aeolus platform
can be designed to implement our programming model. The results show that the
performance is reasonable, and that the approach we take to caching authority state
is effective. We have provided persistent storage, shared volatile state and process
isolation that demonstrate the different components of our model.
9.3 Future Work
This thesis has demonstrated one design of the distributed computing platform. We
plan to look at changing how we store the authority state. At present, this is stored
in a database, which may be too heavy-weight and inefficient. We would like to
investigate alternative structures, such as direct use of disk storage. Also, in our
prototype, cores are variable size and hence, optimizations of core storage allocation
and access are difficult, and we are looking for approaches to managing cores that
better match the physical constraints of server hardware.
Auditing is an important feature that can strengthen the security of systems by
deterring misuse and holding users accountable for their actions. We want to log every
event with security implications, along with information about who did it, when and
how. Such information can be valuable and we intend to study what types of auditing
information are useful in a system like Aeolus and how our platform must be extended
to capture and store this data. In addition, since principal IDs are opaque to Aeolus,
auditing requires us to allow application developers to store information about real
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people who are associated with a particular principal ID. Such data will pose privacy
issues and we may want to store them in an encrypted form. There are also questions
about what types of queries on the audit trail our system can support and what
restrictions must be in place to protect the privacy concerns of such data.
Another future direction is to integrate databases into the model in a flexible way
that allows "multi-labeled' relations. The problem here is that we need fine-grained
labels and having a single set of labels per relation is not sufficient. Consider a
database table that contains patient records where tuple contains information about
a particular patient; at the very least, we want a patient-specific label on each record.
How can we design database systems that support this efficiently? Furthermore, what
should the semantics be for queries on such relations?
Our prototype platform relies on type-safety to isolate processes and hence is
limited to applications written in languages such as C# and Java. How do we go about
supporting unsafe languages like C? Perhaps this will bring our platform architecture
closer to systems like Flume and HiStar, which have a smaller secure base. A big
issue will be how processes in app-objects and how shared state can be implemented
efficiently.
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Appendix A
Aeolus Programming API
A.1 Aeolus Basic Model
CreatePrincipal(out P)
Creates a new principal in the process' principal's core and returns the new principal ID PI.
Constraint(s): None.
Effect(s): Process principal P acts for the new principal P1.
CreatePrincipallnNewCore(out PI)
Creates a new principal in a new core and returns the new principal ID PI.
Constraint(s): None.
Effect(s): Process principal P acts for the new principal P1.
CreatePrincipal(in P2, out P1)
Creates a new principal in the same core as principal P2 and returns the new principal ID PI.
Constraint(s): None.
Effect(s): Process principal P acts for the new principal PI.
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CreateTag(out T)
Creates a new top-level tag T.
Constraint(s): None.
Effect(s): Process' principal P has authority for tag T.
CreateSubTag(in T1, out T2)
Creates a sub-tag of Ti and returns the new sub-tag ID T2.
Constraint(s): Ti must be a top-level tag.
Effect(s): Process' principal P has authority for tag T2.
CreateSubTag(in T1, in P1, out T2)
Creates a sub-tag of Ti, stores the tag info in the same core as principal P1 and returns the new sub-
tag ID T2.
Constraint(s): Ti must be a top-level tag.
Effect(s): Process' principal P has authority for tag T2.
ActFor(in P1, in P2)
Adds an act-for link from actor principal P2 to actee principal Pi.
Constraint(s): Process' principal must act for principal P1.
Effect(s): Principal P2 has authority for all tags that principal P1 has authority for.
RevokeActFor(in P1, in P2)
Removes the act-for link from principal P2 to principal PI.
Constraint(s): Process' principal must act for principal PI.
Effect(s): Principal P2 no longer has any derived authority from principal P1.
Delegate(in T, in P1, in P2)
Gives authority for tag T from grantor principal P to grantee principal P2.
Constraint(s): Process' principal must act for the grantor principal P1. The grantor principal P
must have authority for tag T.
Effect(s): Principal P2 has authority for tag T.
RevokeDelegate(in T, in PI, in P2)
Revokes authority for tag T from grantor principal PI to grantee principal P2.
Constraint(s): Process' principal must act for the grantor principal PI and the tag Tmust have been
previously delegated from P1 to P2.
Effect(s): Principal P2 no longer has authority for tag T via principal P1. All transitive delegations
are also revoked.
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AddSecrecy(in 7)
Adds tag Tto the process' secrecy label.
Constraint(s): None.
Effect(s): Process' secrecy label includes tag T.
Removeintegrity(in 7)
Removes tag T from the process' integrity label.
Constraint(s): None.
Effect(s): Process' integrity label does not include tag T.
Declassify(in 7T)
Removes tag T from the process' secrecy label.
Constraint(s): Process' principal must have authority for T.
Effect(s): Process' secrecy label does not include tag T.
Endorse(in 7)
Adds tag T to the process' integrity label.
Constraint(s): Process' principal must have authority for T.
Effect(s): Process' integrity label includes tag T.
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A.2 Aeolus Extensions
CreateClosure(in key, out CLI)
Creates a new closure with the key and returns the closure ID CL1.
Constraint(s): None.
Effect(s): A new anonymous principal PA is generated and bound to this key and closure ID. This
principal has no authority.
CreateClosure(in key, in P1, out CLI)
Creates a new closure with the key, stores the closure info in the same core as principal P1 and
returns the closure ID CL1.
Constraint(s): None.
Effect(s): A new anonymous principal PA is generated and bound to this key and closure ID. This
principal has no authority.
ClosureActFor(in P1, in CLI)
Adds an act-for link from the anonymous principal PA of closure CL1 to principal P1.
Constraint(s): Closure CL1 must exist. Process' principal must act for principal P1.
Effect(s): Anonymous Principal PA is authoritative for all tags that principal P1 has authority for.
ClosureDelegate(in T, in P1, in CL1)
Gives authority for tag T from grantor principal P1 to grantee anonymous principal PA of closure
CL1.
Constraint(s): Closure CLI must exist. Process' principal must act for the grantor principal P1. The
grantor principal P1 must have authority for tag T.
Effect(s): Anonymous Principal PA has authority for tag T.
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CreateBox(in outerS, in outerl, in innerS, in innerl, out AeolusBox b)
Creates a new empty box b with the specified labels.
Constraint(s): The innerS and innerl labels must be at least as restrictive as the outerS and outerl
labels. The process labels must allow the write based on the outer labels.
Effect(s): Box b exists in the process' heap.
b.GetlnnerSO
Retrieves the inner secrecy label of box b.
Constraint(s): Box b must exists. The process labels must allow the read using b's outer labels.
Effect(s): None.
b.GetlnnerlO
Retrieves the inner integrity label of box b.
Constraint(s): Box b must exists. The process labels must allow the read using b's outer labels.
Effect(s): None.
b.GetContents(out content)
Retrieves the content of box b.
Constraint(s): Box b must exists. The process labels must allow the read using b's inner labels.
Effect(s): None.
b.PutContents(in content)
Copies content into box b.
Constraint(s): Box b must exists. The process labels must allow the write using b's inner labels.
Effect(s): None.
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SHARED OBJECTS
CreateObject(in o, out s)
Creates a new shared state object that is a copy of object o in shared state and returns a new
SharedObjectlD s.
Constraint(s): None.
Effect(s): Object o exists in shared state with the same labels as the process'.
CreateObject(in o, in S, in I, out s)
Creates a new shared state object that is a copy of object o in shared state with secrecy label S and
integrity label I and returns a new SharedObjectlD s.
Constraint(s): Process labels must be no more restrictive these labels.
Effect(s): Object o exists in shared state.
GetObject(in s, out o)
Retrieves a copy of shared object o identified by SharedObjectlD s.
Constraint(s): Shared object must exist at ID s and the process labels must allow the read using o's
labels.
Effect(s): Object o exists in the requestor process' heap.
ReplaceObject(in s, in o)
Replaces the current object associated with SharedStateObjectID s with a copy of object o.
Constraint(s): Shared object must exist at ID s and the process labels must allow the write using o's
labels.
Effect(s): Shared object associated with ID s contains object o.
ReplaceObject(in s, in o, in listS, in listl)
Replaces the current object associated with SharedStateObjectlD s with a copy of object o.
Constraint(s): Shared object must exist at ID s and the process labels adjusted with declassification
of tags in listS and endorsement of tags in listl must allow the write using o's labels. Process
principal P must have authority for all tags in listS and listl.
Effect(s): Shared object associated with ID s contains object o.
DeleteObject(in s)
Removes the shared object associated with SharedObjectID s.
Constraint(s): Shared object must exist at ID s and the process must have a null secrecy label and
the same integrity label as the object's.
Effect(s): Shared object associated with s is removed.
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SHARED QUEUES
CreateQueue(out q)
Creates a new and empty shared queue in shared state and returns its SharedQueuelD q.
Constraint(s): None.
Effect(s): Shared queue q exists in shared state with the same labels as the process'.
CreateQueue(in S, in I, out q)
Creates a new and empty shared queue in shared state with secrecy label S and integrity label I and
returns its SharedQueuelD q.
Constraint(s): Process labels must be no more restrictive than these labels.
Effect(s): Shared queue q exists in shared state.
Enqueue(in q, in o)
Appends object o at the end of the shared queue with SharedQueuelD q.
Constraint(s): Shared queue must exist at ID q and the process labels must allow the write using q's
labels.
Effect(s): Object o is appended to the shared queue.
Enqueue(in q, in o, in listS, in listl)
Appends object o at the end of the shared queue with SharedQueuelD q.
Constraint(s): Shared queue must exist at ID q and the process labels adjusted with declassification
of tags in listS and endorsement of tags in listI must allow the write using q's labels. Process
principal P must have authority for tags in listS and listl.
Effect(s): Object o is appended to the shared queue.
GetQueue(in q, out List[o)
Retrieves the list of objects List[o] in shared queue identified by SharedQueuelD q and clears the
queue.
Constraint(s): Shared object must exist at ID s and the process labels must be the same as q's labels.
Effect(s): Shared queue is empty.
WaitAndDequeue(in q, out o)
Blocks until the shared queue associated with SharedQueuelD q is non-empty, returns and removes
the first object o in this queue.
Constraint(s): Shared object must exist at ID s and the process must be the same as q's.
Effect(s): Removes the first entry of the queue.
DeleteQueue(in q)
Removes the shared queue associated with SharedQueuelD s.
Constraint(s): Shared queue must exist at ID s and the process must have a null secrecy label and
the same integrity label as the queue's.
Effect(s): Shared queue associated with q is removed.
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SHARED LOCKS
CreateLock(out k)
Creates a new shared state lock and returns a new SharedLocklD k.
Constraint(s): None.
Effect(s): Lock k exists in shared state with the same labels as the process'.
CreateLock(in o, in S, in I, out s)
Creates a new shared state lock in shared state with secrecy label S and integrity label I and returns
a new SharedLocklD k.
Constraint(s): Process labels must be no more restrictive these labels.
Effect(s): Lock k exists in shared state.
Lock(in k)
Attempts to acquire lock on k. If locked, blocks until unlocked and acquires lock.
Constraint(s): Shared lock must exist at ID k and the process labels must allow the read and write
using k's labels.
Effect(s): Upon return, lock is acquired on shared lock k.
Unlock(in k)
Unlocks the shared lock k.
Constraint(s): Process labels must allow the write using k's labels.
Effect(s): Shared lock k is unlocked.
Deleterock(in k)
Removes the shared lock associated with SharedLocklD k.
Constraint(s): Shared lock must exist at ID k and the process must have a null secrecy label and the
same integrity label as the lock's.
Effect(s): Shared lock associated with k is removed.
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A.3 Aeolus Execution
abstract AeolusCallable
void Invoke();
I
Fork(in C)
Invokes AeolusCallable code object C in a new process with requestor process' principal and labels.
Constraint(s): None.
Effect(s): Code object C is copied to and invoked in the new process.
Fork(in C, in P1)
Invokes AeolusCallable code object C in a new process with principal P1 and requestor process'
labels
Constraint(s): Requestor process' principal must act for principal P1.
Effect(s): Code object C is copied to and invoked in the new process.
Fork(in C, in P1, in listS, in listl)
Invokes AeolusCallable code C in a new process with principal P1 and requestor process' labels
adjusted with declassification of tags in listS and endorsement of tags in listl.
Constraint(s): Requestor process' principal P must act for principal P1 and P must have authority
for tags in listS and listl.
Effect(s): Code object C is copied to and invoked in the new process.
Call(in C, in P1)
Invokes AeolusCallable code C with principal P1.
Constraint(s): Requestor process' principal P must act for principal P1.
Effect(s): Code object C is invoked in the same process. At the end of the call, the process'
principal is restored to P and the process' labels reflect contamination from executing call.
Call(in C, in P1, in listS, in listl)
Invokes AeolusCallable code C with principal P1 and requestor process' labels adjusted with
declassification of tags in listS and endorsement of tags in listl.
Constraint(s): Requestor process' principal P must act for principal P1 and P must have authority
for tags in listS and listl.
Effect(s): Code object C is invoked in the same process. At the end of the call, the process'
principal is restored to P and the process' labels reflect contamination from executing call.
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abstract AeolusClosureCallable
GetClosureID(out ClosureID CL1);
GetCertificate(out string certifier);
void Invoke() ;
CallClosure(in CL)
Invokes AeolusClosureCallable code object C with anonymous principal PA associated with closure
ID CL1.
Constraint(s): Code object C must be verified using closure key associated with closure ID CLI.
Effect(s): Code object C is invoked in a new process. At the end of the call, the process' principal is
restored to the requestor's and the process' labels reflect contamination from executing call.
CallClosure(in CL, in listS, in listl)
Invokes AeolusClosureCallable code object C with anonymous principal PA associated with closure
ID CL1 and requestor process' labels adjusted with declassification of tags in listS and endorsement
of tags in listl.
Constraint(s): Code object C must be verified using closure key associated with closure ID CLI and
requestor process' principal P must have authority for tags in listS and listl.
Effect(s): Code object C is invoked in a new process. At the end of the call, the process' principal is
restored to the requestor's and the process' labels reflect contamination from executing call.
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A.4 Aeolus File System
CreateFilesystemO
Creates a new filesystem.
Constraint(s): None.
Effect(s): The root entry of the filesystem will have the same labels as the process'.
CreateFilesystem(in S, in I)
Creates a new filesystem with root entry protected by secrecy label S and integrity label I.
Constraint(s): The process labels must be no more restrictive than these labels.
RemoveFilesystem
Removes the filesystem.
Constraint(s): The process labels must allow the write of the root entry.
CreateDir(in F)
Creates a directory with filepath F.
Constraint(s): The process labels must allow the read and write of the parent directory.
Effect(s): The directory will have the same labels as the process'.
CreateDir(in F, in S, in I)
Creates a directory with filepath F, secrecy label S and integrity label I
Constraint(s): The process labels must allow the read and write of the parent directory. The process
labels must be no more restrictive than the S and I labels.
CreateFile(in F)
Creates a file with full filename F.
Constraint(s): The process labels must allow the read and write of the parent directory.
Effect(s): The file will have the same labels as the process'.
CreateFile(in F, in S, in I)
Creates a file with full filename F, secrecy label S and integrity label I.
Constraint(s): The process labels must allow the read and write of the parent directory.
RemoveDir(in F)
Deletes the directory with filepath F and any sub-directories or files.
Constraint(s): The process labels must allow the read and write of the parent directory.
RemoveFile(in F)
Deletes the file with full filename F.
Constraint(s): The process labels must allow the read and write of the parent directory.
ListDir(in F, out listF)
Lists the files and directories in directory with filepath F.
Constraint(s): The process labels must allow the read of the parent directory.
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OpenFilestream(in F, in M, in fistS, in istl, out fs)
Creates a filestream for file with full filename F and specifies the access mode M. There are three
access modes: READ-ONLY, WRITE-ONLY and READWRITE.
Constraint(s): Process' principal must have authority for the tags in listS and listI.
Effect(s): For READWRITE and WRITE-ONLY, selectively declassify tags in listS and endorse
tags in listl during the write.
fs.CloseFilestreamo(
Closes filestreamfs.
Constraint(s): Filestreamfs must exist.
Effect(s): Filestreamfs is closed if opened.
MODE: READ-ONLY, READWRITE
fs.Read(in N, out buffer)
Reads N bytes from the filestream into buffer.
Constraint(s): The filestream must be opened in a readable mode. The file and process labels must
allow the read of the file.
MODE: READ-WRITE, WRITE-ONLY
fs.Write(in buffer)
Writes the content of buffer to the filestream.
Constraint(s): The filestream must be opened in a writable mode. The file and process labels must
allow the write of the file.
170
READ AND WRITE ENTIRE FILE
ReadFile(in F, out buffer)
Reads file with full filename F into buffer.
Constraint(s): The process labels must allow the read of the file.
Effect(s): Buffer contains content of file F.
WriteFile(in F, in buffer, in listS, in listl)
Writes the content of buffer to file with full filename F
Constraint(s): The process labels must allow the write of the file. In addition, the process' principal
must be authoritative for the tags in listS and listl.
Effect(s): File F overwritten with content of buffer.
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